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CONSTITUTIONAL TOLLI NG AND
PREENFORCEMENT CHALLENGES TO PRIVATE
RIGHTS OF ACTION
Michael T. Morley*
A person wishing to challenge the constitutionality of a law that regulates their
conduct typically may sue the government official responsible for enforcing that
provision for declaratory and injunctive relief pursuant to Ex parte Young. This
approach is generally unavailable, however, when a plaintiff seeks preenforcement
relief against laws that are enforceable exclusively through a private right of action. In
such cases, there is no government official against whom to bring a typical Young
claim, and constraints such as sovereign immunity and justiciability requirements
often pose insurmountable obstacles. A person subject to an apparently unconstitutional law that is enforced solely through private litigation therefore faces the choice of
either complying with the provision, thereby foregoing the exercise of their constitutional
rights, or exercising their claimed rights in violation of the provision and running the
risk of incurring potentially substantial liability if a court ultimately upholds the
provision’s validity.
The most direct way to alleviate this problem would be for the Court to expand Ex
parte Young’s exception to sovereign immunity to allow rightsholders to sue some
designated official to challenge laws that are only enforceable through private rights of
action. This approach faces a series of serious doctrinal challenges, however. Even if
the Court is unwilling to go so far, Young itself may nevertheless provide the
foundation for at least partly resolving this dilemma. Young is best known for creating
its broadly used exception to state sovereign immunity. But Young also suggested that,
at least under certain circumstances, a person has the due process right to obtain a
judicial ruling concerning a legal provision’s validity without having to incur the risk
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of potentially substantial liability by violating it. The Court applied this principle in
several post-Young cases, holding that when a party is unable to bring a
preenforcement challenge to a legal provision under Young, they may raise their
constitutional challenge as a defense in enforcement proceedings. Even if the court
rejects that constitutional defense, the party is protected from substantial liability for
violations of the challenged provision that occurred prior to the court’s ruling. Some
modern courts continue to recognize this “constitutional tolling” doctrine. By expressly
reaffirming—with appropriate modifications and restrictions—the constitutional
tolling doctrine, the Court could mitigate the potential chill to constitutional rights
posed by laws that appear to regulate constitutionally protected conduct and are
enforceable solely through private rights of action. And Congress could further help
protect constitutional rights by enacting a federal statute abrogating state sovereign
immunity against preenforcement constitutional challenges to such provisions.
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INTRODUCTION
When a person believes that a legal provision which regulates
their conduct violates the U.S. Constitution or a federal statute, they
generally have three alternatives. First, they may allow the potential
penalties for violating that legal provision to chill their conduct,
deterring them from performing their desired activities. If the
provision actually is invalid, then the person will have been either
deterred from exercising their constitutional rights or otherwise
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subject to restrictions that the government lacked authority to
implement.
Second, the person may violate the legal provision, running the
risk of triggering an administrative proceeding, civil enforcement suit,
or criminal prosecution. They may raise their constitutional argument
as a defense in such proceedings. If the person prevails, they will not
be subject to adverse legal consequences and res judicata will preclude
the opposing party from relitigating the issue against them.1
Conversely, if the court rejects their constitutional claim, then the
person may face fines, penalties, and potentially even imprisonment.
Third, the person may often seek preenforcement relief by filing
a lawsuit in federal court against the federal or state official responsible
for enforcing the legal provision at issue.2 The lawsuit may seek an
injunction to bar that official from prosecuting the plaintiff under the
challenged provision,3 a declaratory judgment that the provision is
unconstitutional,4 or both.5 If the person prevails, they cannot be
subject to sanctions—at least by the government6—for their contemplated conduct. If, in contrast, the court rejects their constitutional
claim, then they remain protected from civil or criminal liability so
long as they did not violate the challenged legal provision.
Preenforcement litigation allows people to obtain judicial
determinations of their rights without exposing themselves to the risk
1 See Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436 (1970) (applying collateral estoppel based on a
previous acquittal in a criminal case); see also Montana v. United States, 440 U.S. 147 (1979)
(enforcing collateral estoppel against the government).
2 See Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908).
3 At a minimum, an individual plaintiff—that is, a plaintiff in a non-class-action suit
that is not suing in an associational capacity, see Hunt v. Wash. State Apple Advert. Comm’n,
432 U.S. 333, 343 (1977) (explaining associational standing)—may obtain an injunction
barring the defendant from enforcing the challenged legal provision against the plaintiff
itself. Substantial dispute has arisen, however, over whether the plaintiff may instead seek
a broader injunction completely barring the defendant from enforcing the challenged
provision against third-party nonlitigants—other similarly situated rightholders—as well.
See Michael T. Morley, Disaggregating Nationwide Injunctions, 71 ALA. L. REV. 1, 9–10, 28–34
(2019) (explaining the concerns with nationwide or statewide defendant-oriented
injunctions that completely bar a governmental defendant from enforcing a challenged
legal provision against anyone, anywhere throughout the state or nation).
4 A person may seek a declaratory judgment in a preenforcement suit even if they
cannot meet the equitable requirements for injunctive relief. See Steffel v. Thompson, 415
U.S. 452, 475 (1974).
5 The Younger doctrine, however, generally prohibits a state criminal defendant from
seeking a federal injunction to prohibit an ongoing prosecution on constitutional grounds.
See Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 53–54 (1971).
6 See infra notes 74–78 and accompanying text (explaining how even successful
litigation against government defendants does not completely protect rightholders when a
statute may be enforced either by the government or through private rights of action).
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of potentially substantial penalties or imprisonment. When plaintiffs
seek such preenforcement relief against a statute or regulation that is
enforceable by the government, they sue either the particular official
or the head of the agency empowered to enforce that provision, in that
person’s official capacity.7 The resulting injunction or declaratory
judgment provides full ex ante protection to the rightholder, so long
as government agencies or officials are the only ones authorized to
enforce the challenged provision.8
Some statutes, however, create private rights of action, allowing
private plaintiffs to sue alleged violators. Such laws may allow plaintiffs
to recover not only actual compensatory damages, but presumed
statutory damages regardless of the actual harm they have suffered,
civil fines, punitive damages, injunctions, and attorneys’ fees.9 These
potentially substantial remedies can exert a tremendous deterrent
effect, chilling private conduct almost to the same extent as criminal
sanctions. Yet because the statutes are enforced by private plaintiffs
rather than a particular government official, there is usually no obvious
defendant for a person to sue in a preenforcement action. People
whose conduct is restricted by laws creating private rights of action
therefore face a dilemma: they may either comply with the statute even
though it may be unconstitutional, or violate the statute and raise their
constitutional claims as defenses, thereby running the risk of incurring
potentially substantial liability.

7 See Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 277 (1986).
8 Of course, an injunction or declaratory judgment may be overturned on appeal or
vacated after the case has concluded. And a preliminary injunction may be dissolved at the
end of a case if the court determines that the plaintiff has not met its burden of proof. The
Supreme Court has expressly left open the question of whether a plaintiff who violates a
legal provision while its enforcement has been enjoined may be retroactively prosecuted
for such conduct if the injunction is later reversed, vacated, or dissolved. See Edgar v. MITE
Corp., 457 U.S. 624, 630 & n.5 (1982) (holding that a substantial dispute exists over whether
a litigant is subject to “civil or criminal penalties” under such circumstances); see also id. at
665 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (recognizing the “possibility” that the plaintiff might be
subject to an enforcement action for violating an Illinois statute after obtaining a
preliminary injunction against that law if the injunction were later overturned on appeal,
but declining to resolve the issue); Jonathan F. Mitchell, The Writ-of-Erasure Fallacy, 104 VA.
L. REV. 933, 987 (2018) (defending such retroactive prosecutions). In other work, I have
argued that plaintiffs should not be subject to sanctions with a punitive component for acts
taken pursuant to an erroneous injunction. Michael T. Morley, Erroneous Injunctions, 71
EMORY L.J. (forthcoming 2022).
9 See Michael T. Morley, Spokeo: The Quasi-Hohfeldian Plaintiff and the Nonfederal
Federal Question, 25 GEO. MASON L. REV. 583, 589 n.46 (2018) (providing examples of
statutes creating private rights of action with substantial enforcement provisions).
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States have periodically adopted restrictions on abortions,10 such
as bans on abortions for minors11 and partial-birth abortions,12 that are
enforceable through private rights of action. The Texas Heartbeat Act,
commonly referred to as S.B. 8, was specifically structured to exploit
the difficulty in obtaining preenforcement rulings concerning the
validity of laws enforceable solely through private rights of action.13
The statute requires a physician to determine whether a fetus has a
“detectable . . . heartbeat” prior to performing an abortion,14 except
in emergencies.15 It goes on to prohibit a physician from “knowingly
perform[ing] or induc[ing] an abortion on a pregnant woman if the
physician detect[s] a fetal heartbeat,”16 even though the U.S. Supreme
Court held in Planned Parenthood v. Casey that states may not prohibit
women from obtaining abortions prior to fetal viability.17
The Texas Heartbeat Act specifies that it “shall be enforced
exclusively through . . . private civil actions.”18 It expressly prohibits
the “state, a political subdivision, a district or county attorney, or an
executive or administrative officer or employee of this state or a
political subdivision” from enforcing, or threatening to enforce, these
restrictions.19 Anyone other than a state or local entity, officer, or

10 See, e.g., LA. STAT. ANN. § 9:2800.12(A) (1997) (allowing women who receive
abortions to bring private civil actions against the physicians who perform them).
11 See, e.g., OKLA. STAT. tit. 63, § 63-1-740 (2021) (providing a cause of action against
a physician who performs an abortion on a minor for “the cost of any subsequent medical
treatment such minor might require because of the abortion”), conditionally repealed, 2021
Okla. Sess. Laws, ch. 308, §§ 2, 18 (providing this provision is repealed if the U.S. Supreme
Court overturns Planned Parenthood of Southeast Pennsylvania v. Casey’s restrictions on states’
ability to ban abortion, or the U.S. Constitution is amended in that regard).
12 See, e.g., WIS. STAT. § 895.038(2)(a), (3)(a) (2022) (providing a cause of action for
the father of a fetus or the parents of a minor against a physician who performs a partialbirth abortion, and authorizing the recovery of damages for “personal injury and emotional
and psychological distress”); ALA. CODE § 26-23-5 (1975) (allowing the husband of a woman
or the parents of a minor who obtains a partial-birth abortion to sue for “monetary
compensation for all injuries, psychological and physical,” that resulted, as well as punitive
damages); see also 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. § 513/15 (allowing the parents of a minor who
obtains a partial-birth abortion to sue for monetary damages for “psychological and
physical” injury to the minor “and statutory damages equal to 3 times the cost of the partialbirth abortion”), repealed by Reproductive Health Act, Pub. Act. No.101-13, 775 ILL. COMP.
STAT. § 55/905-20 (2019).
13 Texas Heartbeat Act, S.B. 8, 87th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Tex. 2021) (codified at TEX.
HEALTH & SAFETY CODE, §§ 171.201–171.212 (West 2021)).
14 TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 171.203(b) (West 2021).
15 Id. § 171.205(a).
16 Id. § 171.204(a).
17 Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 878–79 (1992).
18 TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 171.207(a) (West 2021).
19 Id.
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employee may sue any person who performs, induces, or aids and abets
a woman in obtaining an abortion of a fetus with a detectable
heartbeat.20 The court may award injunctive relief, statutory damages
of at least $10,000, and attorneys’ fees.21
If the statute had been an ordinary criminal or even administrative
restriction enforceable by the government, outside groups could have
brought a preenforcement challenge and obtained a preliminary
injunction barring its enforcement based on its direct conflict with
Casey.22 But because the statute’s prohibitions are enforceable solely
through a private right of action involving substantial statutory
damages, there was no immediately apparent government official to
sue for preenforcement relief.23 Despite the law’s apparent invalidity,
it has had a substantial deterrent effect. Press accounts suggest that
abortions in Texas have plummeted,24 with many women driving hours
to seek abortions in other states.25 More broadly, several states have
looked to the Texas law as a model, not only for their own anti-abortion
statutes,26 but anti-gun laws and other measures that raise serious
constitutional questions27 and would likely be quickly enjoined if they
took the form of typical criminal or administrative prohibitions.

20 Id. § 171.208(a)(1)–(3).
21 Id. § 171.208(b)(1)–(3).
22 Of course, if the case made its way to the U.S. Supreme Court, the Court could have
taken the opportunity to overturn Casey, which would have affected the statute’s
constitutionality. Many commentators anticipate that the Court may revisit Casey this term
in Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health Org., 141 S. Ct. 2619 (2021) (mem.) (granting certiorari).
See Mary Ziegler, Opinion, The End of Roe Is Coming, and It Is Coming Soon, N.Y. TIMES (Dec.
1,
2021),
https://www.nytimes.com/2021/12/01/opinion/supreme-court-abortionmississippi-law.html [https://perma.cc/B7KQ-65GN].
23 See infra Part I.
24 See Julia Harte, Texas Abortion Clinics Struggle to Survive Under Restrictive Law,
REUTERS (Sept. 30, 2021), https://www.reuters.com/world/us/texas-abortion-clinicsstruggle-survive-under-restrictive-law-2021-09-30/ [https://perma.cc/8WM9-34EM].
25 See Sean Murphy, Texas Women Drive Hours for Abortions After New Law, AP NEWS
(Oct. 14, 2021), https://apnews.com/article/abortion-texas-louisiana-0cc666fde471
f0fe2ce8a5f28977ad28 [https://perma.cc/D8DT-X82Q].
26 Stephen Groves, GOP-Led States See Texas Law as Model to Restrict Abortions, AP NEWS
(Sept. 2, 2021), https://apnews.com/article/health-religion-us-supreme-court-laws23c373f3252d511f15ccc170887c30e2 [https://perma.cc/3HSQ-JAR7]; see, e.g., Alison
Durkee, Ohio Bill Copies Texas’ Abortion Ban—and Goes Further. Here’s Which States Could Be
Next, FORBES (Nov. 3, 2021), https://www.forbes.com/sites/alisondurkee/2021/11/03
/ohio-bill-copies-texas-abortion-ban-and-goes-further-heres-which-states-could-be-next
/?sh=4ba8aca95b84 [https://perma.cc/MJ5F-YQHD].
27 See Maura Dolan, Texas Abortion Law Spurs Copycat Measures, from Guns in California
to Critical Race Theory in Florida, L.A. TIMES (Dec. 22, 2021), https://www.latimes.com
/california/story/2021-12-22/texas-abortion-law-spurs-copycat-proposals-from-guns-tocritical-race-theory [https://perma.cc/29EL-57LL]; see, e.g., Shawn Hubler, Newsom Calls
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Several scholars have recognized how statutes enforceable solely
through private rights of action can deter the exercise of constitutional
rights recognized by Supreme Court precedent.28 Some have argued
that, under current doctrine, lawsuits against a governor or attorney
general to challenge the constitutionality of state laws creating private
rights of action should be deemed justiciable.29 Others contend that
lawsuits against state court judges are the proper way to challenge such
statutes.30 Professor Maya Manian has suggested that “it is the
legislators who enact such laws who should be subject to suit.”31
This Article suggests a new approach. In precedent tracing back
over a century, predating the Declaratory Judgment Act,32 the U.S.
for Gun Legislation Modeled on the Texas Abortion Law, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 12, 2021), https://
www.nytimes.com/2021/12/12/us/politics/newsom-texas-abortion-law-guns.html
[https://perma.cc/C9PC-55PG].
28 See, e.g., Susan Frelich Appleton, Response, Gender, Abortion, and Travel After Roe’s
End, 51 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 655, 679–80 (2007) (discussing the possibility that states with
strong restrictions on abortion may impose civil liability on women who travel to states with
more permissive abortion laws to obtain abortions); Richard D. Rosen, Deterring PreViability Abortions in Texas Through Private Lawsuits, 54 TEX. TECH. L. REV. 115, 163 (2021)

(“[T]hose who provide abortion services must await a lawsuit in the Texas courts
before having the opportunity to lodge constitutional challenges to the laws.” ); A.J.
Stone, III, Consti-Tortion: Tort Law as an End-Run Around Abortion Rights After Planned
Parenthood v. Casey, 8 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 471, 473 (2000) (“[T]ort law
offers other approaches to restricting abortion through the tort system .”); cf. Note,
Private Attorneys General and the Defendant Class Action, 135 HARV. L. REV. 1419, 1419 (2022)
(advocating defendant class actions against potential plaintiffs as a means of challenging
laws establishing private rights of action).
29 See, e.g., Caitlin E. Borgmann, Legislative Arrogance and Constitutional
Accountability, 79 S. CAL. L. REV. 753, 778-80 (2006); Jennifer L. Achilles, Comment, Using
Tort Law to Circumvent Roe v. Wade and Other Pesky Due Process Decisions: An Examination of
Louisiana’s Act 825, 78 TUL. L. REV. 853, 875–76 (2004) (“The Fifth Circuit should have
considered, or at least distinguished, Supreme Court precedent which relaxed standing
principles in the name of giving plaintiffs a remedy. . . . A declaratory judgment in
plaintiffs’ favor would completely redress the plaintiffs’ injuries.”).
30 See, e.g., Georgina Yeomans, Ordering Conduct Yet Evading Review: A Simple Step
Toward Preserving Federal Supremacy, 131 YALE L. J.F. 513, 515 (2021) (“The Court should

use the S.B. 8 debacle as an opportunity to hold that when legislation implicates the
exercise of fundamental rights, but does not admit of a clear path to pre-enforcement
review, litigants can sue state-court judges under Ex parte Young to enjoin the law’s
enforcement.”); Stephen N. Scaife, Comment, The Imperfect but Necessary Lawsuit: Why
Suing State Judges is Necessary to Ensure that Statutes Creating a Private Cause of Action Are
Constitutional, 52 U. RICH. L. REV. 495, 496 (2018) (“[T]he pre-enforcement action

should be brought against state judges who could potentially hear lawsuits brought
under the private cause of action created by the state statute. ”).
31 Maya Manian, Privatizing Bans on Abortion: Eviscerating Constitutional Rights
Through Tort Remedies, 80 TEMP. L. REV. 123, 128 (2007).
32 Declaratory Judgment Act, ch. 512, 48 Stat. 955 (1934) (codified as amended at 28
U.S.C. §§ 2201–02 (2018)).
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Supreme Court recognized that the Due Process Clauses33 grant
people the right to obtain judicial rulings concerning the validity of
legal provisions to which they are subject, without exposing themselves
to potentially substantial liability for violating those provisions.34
Subsequent developments, such as Congress’s enactment of the
Declaratory Judgment Act, have largely marginalized this line of
authority. This Article argues that the Court should reaffirm and
enforce this right, particularly in the context of statutes creating
private rights of action.
One potentially viable way of implementing this right without
substantially modifying both sovereign immunity and justiciability
doctrine would be for the Supreme Court to expressly reaffirm the
principle of “constitutional tolling.” The constitutional tolling doctrine exempts civil defendants from significant liability where they had
a substantial constitutional defense to a legal provision, and they were
unable to raise that issue in preenforcement proceedings.35
Alternatively, Congress may use its enforcement authority under
Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment to abrogate state sovereign
immunity, allowing lawsuits against the state itself to challenge legal
provisions creating private rights of action. Such legislation seems
unlikely to pass in the current, partisanly divided environment,
however.
Part I of this Article lays a foundation by examining the various
doctrinal obstacles that generally preclude plaintiffs from bringing
preenforcement challenges to laws creating private rights of action.
This Part focuses in particular on the ways in which litigants have
attempted to challenge S.B. 8, while also discussing similar suits against
other laws establishing private rights of action. Such litigation is almost
always unsuccessful in federal court.
Part II delves into Ex parte Young’s lesser-known aspects. The
opinion is best known for limiting state sovereign immunity in
constitutional suits against state officials. But Young did more than
simply establish an exception to sovereign immunity. The opinion also
held that putative rightholders should be able to obtain judicial
determinations of the validity of legal provisions that restrict their
conduct without incurring potentially substantial liability. Ex parte
Young recognized that such preenforcement judicial guidance can be
necessary to protect claimed rightholders from irreparable harm—
extricating them from the dilemma of choosing between being chilled

33
34
35

U.S. CONST. amend. V; id. amend. XIV, § 1.
See infra Part II.
See infra notes 240–41 and accompanying text.
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from exercising their rights by a potentially invalid legal provision and
violating that provision to test its validity, thereby subjecting themselves
to potentially substantial liability. Supreme Court cases over the
decade that followed Young reaffirmed the due process right to have
some mechanism for seeking preenforcement judicial guidance as to
a legal provision’s validity.
The Article goes on to assess potential methods of implementing
this right in the context of apparently unconstitutional restrictions that
are enforceable solely through private rights of action. Part III
discusses the difficulties with expanding Ex parte Young’s exception to
state sovereign immunity to allow preenforcement challenges to such
laws. It begins by reviewing the justiciability obstacles to naming state
court judges or clerks as proper defendants in preenforcement suits
under Ex parte Young. It then turns to the possibility of expanding Ex
parte Young to allow plaintiffs to challenge statutory private rights of
action by suing a designated state executive official, such as the
governor or attorney general, despite their lack of enforcement
authority. Such a lawsuit would essentially use a state official as a standin for the state itself to obtain a judgment that effectively bars private
parties from suing under the challenged statute. This would be the
most direct approach. But it would require substantial changes not
only to longstanding sovereign immunity precedent, but justiciability
and res judicata doctrine as well. The current Court appears highly
unlikely to adopt such significant reforms.
Part IV goes on to assess other potential approaches to alleviating
the chilling effects of laws creating potentially unconstitutional private
rights of action. Section A explores the “constitutional tolling”
doctrine rooted in by Ex parte Young. As explained earlier, this
doctrine protects a claimed rightholder from substantial civil liability
under a legal provision to which the rightholder presented a colorable
constitutional challenge that could not be asserted in preenforcement
proceedings. After examining how some modern courts continue to
apply the doctrine, this Section assesses both the drawbacks of this
approach as well as ways in which the doctrine could be modified to
address such concerns. Section B suggests that Congress enact a
federal statute abrogating state sovereign immunity against
preenforcement challenges to state laws creating private rights of
action. Both of these alternatives raise theoretical and practical
concerns. But implementing at least one of them would prevent states
from hindering judicial review and chilling the exercise of
fundamental rights through constitutionally dubious legal restrictions
that are enforceable solely through private rights of action. The final
Part briefly concludes.
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BACKGROUND

A. Barriers to Preenforcement Litigation
When states enact legal restrictions that are solely enforceable
through private rights of action, several barriers exist to seeking
preenforcement relief, such as an injunction or declaratory judgment,
from a federal court. Sovereign immunity bars potential plaintiffs
from suing the state itself. The Eleventh Amendment’s text only strips
federal courts of jurisdiction over suits against a state by citizens of
other states or foreign nations.36 The Supreme Court has long held,
however, that the Constitution preserves broader sovereign immunity
for states,37 protecting them from lawsuits by their own citizens,
including federal question cases,38 in both federal and state court.39
This sovereign immunity extends to lawsuits against state agencies and
other entities,40 such as a legislature, as well as suits against officials
sued in their official capacity41 (subject to the important exception
established in Ex parte Young42).
Both the individual legislators who vote to enact an unconstitutional law, as well as the leaders of those legislative chambers, have
absolute immunity from suit, regardless of the relief sought.43

36 U.S. CONST. amend. XI.
37 See Blatchford v. Native Vill. of Noatak, 501 U.S. 775, 779 (1991) (“[W]e have
understood the Eleventh Amendment to stand not so much for what it says, but for the
presupposition of our constitutional structure which it confirms . . . .”).
38 See Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 15 (1890).
39 See Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 754 (1999).
40 See FDIC v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471, 475 (1994) (“Absent a waiver, sovereign immunity
shields the Federal Government and its agencies from suit.” (first citing Loeffler v. Frank,
486 U.S. 549, 554 (1988); and then citing FHA v. Burr, 309 U.S. 242, 244 (1940))); see, e.g.,
Fed. Mar. Comm’n v. S.C. State Ports Auth., 535 U.S. 743, 769 (2002) (holding that
sovereign immunity protects state agencies from proceedings before federal administrative
agencies).
41 See Will v. Mich. Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989) (“[A] suit against a
state official in his or her official capacity is not a suit against the official but rather is a suit
against the official’s office. . . . As such, it is no different from a suit against the State itself.”
(citing Brandon v. Holt, 469 U.S. 464, 471 (1985))).
42 209 U.S. 123, 159 (1908).
43 See Sup. Ct. of Va. v. Consumers Union of the U.S., 446 U.S. 719, 733–34 (1980)
(holding that, had the legislature or its members been sued for enacting an
unconstitutional statute, such defendants “could successfully have sought dismissal on the
grounds of absolute legislative immunity”); Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367, 379 (1951)
(holding that a plaintiff could not sue state legislators or a state legislative committee for
damages under 8 U.S.C. § 43 (now 42 U.S.C. § 1983) for the committee’s investigative
activities); see also Bogan v. Scott-Harris, 523 U.S. 44, 54 (1998) (holding that legislative
immunity extends to municipal legislators). This common-law immunity is in addition to
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Rightholders subject to such a law would also likely lack standing to
sue the legislators who adopted it,44 on the (misguided) grounds that
the cause of any chilling effect on their rights stems from the
enforcement of that law, rather than its mere existence.45 The Supreme
Court held in Ex parte Young that sovereign immunity does not prevent
rightholders from suing state officers in their official capacities for
prospective relief to prevent future violations of the U.S. Constitution
and federal laws.46 Preenforcement constitutional challenges to state
laws are often brought in the context of such Young-authorized suits.
The Young doctrine, however, allows only suits against state officials
charged with enforcing a particular statute.47 The doctrine has
generally been deemed inapplicable where state laws create only
private rights of action because, by definition, there is no state official
responsible for “enforcing” such laws.48
Courts have generally rejected plaintiffs’ attempts to challenge
statutes creating private rights of action by suing the governor as the
head of the state’s executive branch, or the attorney general as the
state’s chief law enforcement officer, because neither official plays a
role in private lawsuits under such laws.49 They have likewise held that

the constitutional immunity that the Speech and Debate Clause, U.S. CONST. art. I, § 6,
confers on Members of Congress for their legislative activities. See Eastland v. U.S.
Servicemen’s Fund, 421 U.S. 491, 503 (1975).
44 See Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 578 U.S. 330, 338 (2016) (setting forth the requirements
for standing); Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560–61 (1992).
45 See, e.g., Women’s Health Clinic v. State of La., 825 So. 2d 1208, 1213 (La. Ct. App.
2002) (holding that “no justiciable controversy” exists between plaintiffs challenging a
Louisiana law creating a private right of action “and the State of Louisiana”).
46 209 U.S. 123, 159 (1908).
47 Id. at 157 (“In making an officer of the State a party defendant in a suit to enjoin
the enforcement of an act alleged to be unconstitutional it is plain that such officer must
have some connection with the enforcement of the act, or else it is merely making him a
party as a representative of the State, and thereby attempting to make the State a party.”).
48 See, e.g., Okpalobi v. Foster, 244 F.3d 405, 429 (5th Cir. 2001) (en banc) (holding
that the Eleventh Amendment barred a challenge to Louisiana’s law allowing women to sue
physicians who perform abortions on them); Summit Med. Assocs., P.C. v. Pryor, 180 F.3d
1326, 1342 (11th Cir. 1999) (holding that the Eleventh Amendment barred a challenge to
an Alabama law creating a private right of action against physicians who perform partialbirth abortions).
49 See, e.g., Okpalobi, 244 F.3d at 423–44 (holding that the governor and attorney
general had “Eleventh Amendment immunity from . . . suit” because nothing “suggests that
there is any enforcement connection between” them and the challenged law “that satisfies
either of the requirements of Ex parte Young”); Summit Med. Assocs., 180 F.3d at 1342
(holding that a “suit against the Governor, the Attorney General, and the District Attorney
with respect to the private civil enforcement provision of the partial-birth abortion statute
is barred by the Eleventh Amendment”).
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plaintiffs lack standing to sue such defendants.50 When neither the
governor nor attorney general is empowered to enforce a particular
statute, a judgment against them cannot redress any harm to the
plaintiffs that the statute causes. This is the main obstacle to
preenforcement challenges to statutory private rights of action:
because no state official is responsible for enforcing these laws, there
is generally no obvious defendant against whom to bring a justiciable
Young-type preenforcement action.51
Lawsuits against judges or court clerks to forbid them from
accepting complaints, adjudicating cases, or entering judgments based
on purportedly unconstitutional laws may initially seem like a more
effective alternative, but they have fared no better. The Supreme
Court has held that state judges are not immune to claims for
prospective relief concerning their official judicial actions.52 An
amendment to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 specifies that such prospective relief
for an “act or omission taken in such officer’s judicial capacity” must
initially take the form of a declaratory judgment, rather than an
injunction, unless a declaratory judgment is “unavailable.”53
Moreover, the U.S. Supreme Court’s ruling in Mitchum v. Foster holds
that the federal Anti-Injunction Act, which generally prohibits federal
courts from enjoining state court proceedings,54 does not apply to
§ 1983 claims against state judges.55

50 See, e.g., Hope Clinic v. Ryan, 249 F.3d 603, 605 (7th Cir. 2001) (“[P]laintiffs lack
standing to contest the statutes authorizing private rights of action, not only because the
defendants cannot cause the plaintiffs injury by enforcing the private-action statutes, but
also because any potential dispute plaintiffs may have with future private plaintiffs could
not be redressed by an injunction running only against public prosecutors.”); Okpalobi, 244
F.3d at 425–29.
51 See Summit Med. Assocs., 180 F.3d at 1342 (“[F]ederal courts have refused to apply
Ex parte Young where the officer who is charged has no authority to enforce the challenged
statute.”)
52 Pulliam v. Allen, 466 U.S. 522, 541–42 (1984). Nor are judges immune from
criminal prosecution. See Ex parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339, 348–49 (1880). In contrast, judges
have absolute immunity from damages claims for judicial acts that are not taken in clear
excess of their jurisdiction, regardless of the judge’s subjective bad faith. Pierson v. Ray,
386 U.S. 547, 553–54 (1967); see, e.g., Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9 (1991) (per curiam).
53 Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-317, 110 Stat. 3847, 3853
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2018)).
54 See 28 U.S.C. § 2283 (2018) (“A court of the United States may not grant an
injunction to stay proceedings in a State court except as expressly authorized by Act of
Congress, or where necessary in aid of its jurisdiction, or to protect or effectuate its
judgments.”).
55 See Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225, 242–43 (1972) (“[F]ederal injunctive relief
against a state court proceeding can in some circumstances be essential to prevent great,
immediate, and irreparable loss of a person’s constitutional rights.”).
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Ex parte Young, however, suggests that suits to preemptively bar
state judges from adjudicating certain kinds of cases within their
jurisdiction can raise serious sovereign immunity concerns.56 Young
expressly distinguishes between “enjoin[ing] an individual, even
though a state official, from commencing suits,” which is permissible
under certain circumstances, and “restrain[ing] a court from acting in
any case brought before it . . . . [A]n injunction against a state court
would be a violation of the whole scheme of our Government.”57
Moreover, though Mitchum held that the Anti-Injunction Act does not
prohibit § 1983 claims to enjoin state judges, “principles of equity,
comity, and federalism . . . must restrain a federal court when asked to
enjoin a state court proceeding.”58
Serious standing challenges also arise in trying to indirectly
challenge a state law’s validity by suing state court judges. For a state
court judge to be deemed the source of irreparable injury to a plaintiff,
the plaintiff would likely have to establish by a preponderance of the
evidence that: (i) it will violate the underlying law; (ii) such violation
will lead to a civil lawsuit; (iii) the defendant judge will be assigned to
hear the lawsuit; and (iv) the judge will erroneously rule against the
plaintiff in such a lawsuit, failing to enforce the plaintiff’s constitutional rights. Steps (i) and (ii) may be reasonably certain. A defendant
class59 of all state court judges might be sufficient to satisfy step (iii),
though the Court has rejected a comparable argument as applied to
plaintiffs. Summers v. Earth Island Institute held that a plaintiff
organization cannot claim standing to challenge a legal provision on
the grounds that the provision at issue is statistically certain to injure
one or more of its members, particularly where the organization
cannot identify any particular members who actually are impacted.60
Likewise, the fact that some state judge will eventually be assigned a
case arising under a challenged legal provision might be insufficient
to authorize a suit against all state judges (or even all state judges
within a particular county or judicial trial district). Even putting aside
such concerns, the current Court might not consider a state court
judge to be the cause of any injury in fact that a rightholder suffers
from an allegedly unconstitutional statute. Any chilling effect or other
56 See Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 163 (1908).
57 Id.
58 Mitchum, 407 U.S. at 243.
59 See FED. R. CIV. P. 23.
60 See Summers v. Earth Island Inst., 555 U.S. 488, 497 (2009) (rejecting the argument
that an association can establish standing by showing that, based on its “description of the
activities of its members, there is a statistical probability that some of those members are
threatened with concrete injury”).
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such harm appears to stem primarily from the existence of the
statutory cause of action and the decision of a private plaintiff to sue
under it—not the general availability of a state forum in which to
adjudicate and, if appropriate, dismiss such claims.
The difficulty of seeking prospective relief against state judges is
further enhanced by considering the role of the state court judge as
defendant. Ordinarily, a state judge acts as a neutral arbiter, interpreting the meaning of state laws and determining whether they violate the
U.S. Constitution. Suing the judge puts that person in the position of
taking a position—in advance of an actual lawsuit—on the validity of
the challenged legal provision. Either the judge must defend its
validity or agree with the plaintiff as to the law’s invalidity in advance
of any state court proceedings under the challenged provision.
In any event, a plaintiff who obtained relief against a state’s judges
would not be protected from diversity suits under the challenged legal
provision in federal court.61 Nor would such relief preclude the
plaintiff from being sued in the courts of other states that acquire
general personal jurisdiction over the plaintiff, should the plaintiff
travel there.62
Rather than targeting government officials, a person wishing to
bring a preenforcement challenge to a statutory private right of action
might instead seek an injunction or declaratory judgment against
potential plaintiffs. Such suits would similarly face a range of
justiciability-related obstacles. For example, in Nova Health Systems v.
Gandy, a state statute rendered doctors who performed an abortion on
a minor without their parents’ knowledge or consent “liable for the
cost of any subsequent medical treatment” that was necessary as a
result of the procedure.63 Due to this law, an abortion provider
stopped performing abortions on minors without parental consent.64
It sued various state officials who oversaw public hospitals and other
medical institutions, arguing that the statute was unconstitutional.65
The provider alleged that it had changed its policies to avoid being
61 A federal district court ruling in favor of a plaintiff would have no stare decisis effect
in a future federal case brought against that same party under the challenged legal
provision. See Camreta v. Greene, 563 U.S. 692, 706 n.5 (2011). Of course, if the plaintiff’s
original case were appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for that circuit and the plaintiff
prevailed, then that appellate ruling would preclude future federal claims against not only
that party, but other rightholders throughout the circuit, as well, as a matter of stare decisis.
62 See Burnham v. Superior Ct. of Cal., 495 U.S. 604, 619 (1990) (affirming
“jurisdiction based on physical presence alone”).
63 Nova Health Sys. v. Gandy, 416 F.3d 1149, 1152 (10th Cir. 2005) (quoting OKLA.
STAT. tit. 63, § 63-1-740).
64 Id. at 1153, 1155.
65 See id. at 1153–54.
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sued by such medical facilities for the cost of treatment they provided
to minors who had received abortions in violation of the statute.
Neither the defendant officials, nor the institutions they oversaw,
however, had either attempted to sue the abortion provider or
threatened to do so.66
The Tenth Circuit held that the abortion provider lacked standing
to maintain its suit because a live case or controversy did not exist
between it and the defendants. The defendants, although state
officials, were not responsible for enforcing the abortion restrictions.67
The defendants had not caused the abortion provider to change its
policies,68 and a favorable ruling against them would not alleviate the
legal risk to the provider.69 “Even if these defendants were enjoined
from seeking damages against [the abortion provider] . . . there would
still be a multitude of other prospective litigants who could potentially
sue [it],” including the parents of minors who received abortions in
violation of the statute, as well as the physicians and nurses who treated
those minors.70
The Tenth Circuit went on to explain:
[N]othing in the record distinguishes these defendants from any
other party who might one day have the occasion to seek
compensatory damages under the challenged statute as a civil
plaintiff. A party may not attack a tort statute in federal court simply
by naming as a defendant anyone who might someday have a cause
of action under the challenged law.71

Courts will not allow a regulated entity to bootstrap a lawsuit by
preemptively suing a potential plaintiff that has not acted adversely to
it or threatened it on the grounds that person may someday decide to
sue. And the broader the universe of potential plaintiffs under a
statute creating a private right of action, the less likely that a judgment

66 See id. at 1153, 1157.
67 Id. at 1158.
68 Id. at 1157.
69 Id. at 1159.
70 Nova Health Sys., 416 F.3d 1149, 1159 (10th Cir. 2005); cf. K.P. v. LeBlanc, 729 F.3d
427, 437 (5th Cir. 2013) (rejecting constitutional challenge to a law creating a private right
of action against abortion providers due to lack of redressability where the defendants were
board members who managed the state’s medical malpractice compensation fund, because
“[t]he Board Parties are not charged under state law with enforcing this ‘strict liability’
provision . . . [a]nd enjoining the Board Parties from ‘enforcing’ the cause of action would
not address their role in administering the [f]und” or “redress the [plaintiffs’] injury”).
71 Nova Health Sys., 416 F.3d at 1153; see also id. at 1157–58 (“Article III does not allow
a plaintiff who wishes to challenge state legislation to do so simply by naming as a defendant
anyone who, under appropriate circumstances, might conceivably have an occasion to file
a suit for avid damages under the relevant state law at some future date.”).
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against any subset of those plaintiffs would provide meaningful relief.
For consumer-protection statutes that regulate the operations of
national businesses like telemarketers, debt collectors, and credit
reporting agencies, there could be millions of potential plaintiffs.
One extreme way of attempting to address at least part of this
problem would be through a Rule 23(b)(2) defendant class action. A
party could seek an injunction barring anyone with a potential cause
of action under a statute from suing it.72 Such a suit still would likely
not involve a justiciable case or controversy since hardly any, if any, of
the defendant class’ members will have threatened or sued that
plaintiff. And finding a putative defendant class representative could
be a challenge, as well. Perhaps most fundamentally, as the Seventh
Circuit has explained in this context, “an injunction prohibiting the
world from filing private suits would be a flagrant violation of both
Article III and the due process clause (for putative private plaintiffs are
entitled to be notified and heard before courts adjudicate their
entitlements).”73
Even when a law is enforceable through both a private right of action
and government enforcement, bringing a traditional Young suit in federal
court against the officials responsible for enforcing that provision does
not provide immediate comprehensive protection for rightholders. A
ruling against the government does not have any res judicata effect
against third parties, including potential private plaintiffs;74 neither an
injunction nor a declaratory judgment would extend to such thirdparty nonlitigants.75 And the district court’s ruling would lack stare
decisis effect, even within the same district.76 Thus, even after a litigant
successfully challenged the constitutionality of a legal provision by
suing a governmental defendant at the district court level, a private
plaintiff could still sue that litigant under the provision at issue.
Moreover, even if a litigant successfully defended against such a private
lawsuit at the district court level, it would remain subject to subsequent
suits by other, unrelated private plaintiffs, either in the same court or
other jurisdictions.
Once a federal court of appeals holds the challenged statute
unconstitutional, however, both the rightholder in that case, as well as
other third-party nonlitigants, become protected from subsequent
72 See Morley, supra note 3, at 41–46 (discussing nationwide private enforcement
injunctions); see also Note, supra note 28, at 1434–35.
73 Hope Clinic v. Ryan, 249 F.3d 603, 605 (7th Cir. 2001).
74 See Taylor v. Sturgell, 553 U.S. 880, 892–95 (2008) (discussing the scope of nonparty
preclusion).
75 See, e.g., Texas v. U.S. Dep’t of Lab., 929 F.3d 205, 213 (5th Cir. 2019).
76 See Camreta v. Greene, 563 U.S. 692, 709 n.7 (2011).
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federal suits within that circuit as a matter of vertical stare decisis. That
stare decisis effect would not extend either to lawsuits brought in other
federal circuits or, perhaps more importantly, in state courts, which
are generally free to ignore federal court of appeals precedents, even
concerning federal issues.77 Only rulings of the U.S. Supreme Court
on federal issues have nationwide vertical stare decisis effect on both
federal and state courts. If the Court held the challenged legal
provision unconstitutional, that ruling would render subsequent
claims under it legally frivolous and likely even sanctionable.78 Short
of that, a ruling from a state supreme court (or, depending on the
state’s rules governing stare decisis, a state intermediate appellate
court) holding the challenged legal provision unconstitutional would
typically appear to provide the most substantial protection to successful
litigants. If there is no way to obtain such a ruling without risking the
possibility of incurring substantial statutory damages, fines, or other
penalties should the challenged legal provision be upheld, then it may
remain in effect indefinitely, exerting a chilling effect on rightholders
who fear courts may disagree with their prediction about the
provision’s invalidity.
B. Challenging S.B. 8
The litigation concerning S.B. 8 has been a case study in the
difficulties rightholders face in seeking rulings concerning the validity
of laws creating private rights of action. Litigants have employed a
variety of approaches to attempt to challenge the measure’s
constitutionality.
1. Federal Interpleader
An abortion provider attempted to lay the foundation for a
constitutional challenge to S.B. 8 by admitting in the Washington Post
that he violated the statute on a single occasion, effectively instigating
people to sue him.79 This approach required him to incur potential
liability under the statute, while then refraining from future violations
until any resulting was litigation was resolved. After being sued by
several people for his admitted violation, Braid filed a federal
interpleader suit in an Illinois federal district court. He invited the

77 See Kevin M. Clermont, Reverse-Erie, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1, 20 (2006).
78 See FED. R. CIV. P. 11.
79 See Alan Braid, Why I Violated Texas’s Extreme Abortion Ban, WASH. POST (Sept. 18,
2021), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2021/09/18/texas-abortion-provideralan-braid/ [https://perma.cc/S34J-LFJE].
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court to determine which, if any, of the plaintiffs who sued him were
entitled to recover the statutory damages.80 He also argued that no
one is entitled to recover those damages from him since S.B. 8’s
substantive restrictions are unconstitutional.81 This is basically an
attempt to litigate enforcement actions in federal court rather than
state court.
This strategy appears to be among the least viable means of
challenging S.B. 8. Even if Braid were to prevail both before the
district court and circuit court, the resulting ruling—which would be
issued by the Seventh Circuit—would not have stare decisis effect in
either Texas federal courts, where diversity-based S.B. 8 litigation is
most likely to arise, or Texas state court. Indeed, a judgment in either
the interpleader case or the original enforcement proceedings against
these plaintiffs would not even protect Braid against lawsuits from
other plaintiffs in the future for any subsequent violations. And finally,
it appears at least reasonably debatable whether interpleader is
available under these circumstances.82
2. Suit by the United States
The United States government sued the State of Texas for “a
declaratory judgment that S.B. 8 is ‘invalid under the Supremacy
Clause and the Fourteenth Amendment, is preempted by federal law,
and violates the doctrine of intergovernmental immunity.’”83 The
United States further sought a preliminary injunction barring the state
or any of its officers from enforcing the measure.84 The district court
held that the government had standing in two respects. First, S.B. 8
interfered with the government’s statutory obligation to provide
abortion-related services under certain circumstances by subjecting its
employees and contractors to potential liability.85 The government

80 See Complaint for Interpleader and Declaratory Judgment, Braid v. Stilley, No. 21cv-05283 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 5, 2021).
81 See Notice of Constitutional Question, Braid v. Stilley, No. 21-cv-05283 (N.D. Ill.
Oct. 5, 2021).
82 See State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Tashire, 386 U.S. 523, 535–36 (1967) (discussing
limits of interpleader).
83 See United States v. Texas, No. 21-CV-796, 2021 WL 4593319, at *6 (W.D. Tex. Oct.
6, 2021) (quoting Complaint, Texas, 21-CV-796, 2021 WL 4593319, at *3), administrative stay
granted, No. 21-50949, 2021 WL 4706452 (5th Cir. Oct. 8, 2021), and stay granted, No. 2150949, 2021 WL 4786458 (5th Cir. Oct. 14, 2021), cert. before judgment granted, 142 S. Ct. 14
(2021) (mem.), and certiorari dismissed as improvidently granted, 142 S. Ct. 522 (2021) (mem.)
(per curiam).
84 Id.
85 Id. at *13.
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also had standing “to file suit in parens patriae for probable violations
of its citizens’ Constitutional rights.”86 It could invoke such standing
to “protect[] the supremacy of the Constitution by opposing laws that
shield violations of U.S. citizens’ constitutional rights from federal
judicial review.”87
The court went on to hold that, because the government sought
an equitable remedy, it did not need to identify a particular cause of
action.88 The court emphasized that state actors had “worked
deliberately to craft a statutory scheme that would avoid review by the
courts, and thereby circumvent any pronouncement of its
unconstitutionality. . . . [E]quity allows the United States to sue when
other remedies are deliberately withheld by the State.”89 It further
ruled that the state was a proper defendant because “[t]he operation
and enforcement of S.B. 8 requires the State and its employees to act,
whether those acts are the maintenance of a lawsuit or carrying out a
court order regarding the enforceability of S.B. 8.”90 It concluded by
claiming authority to enjoin private individuals from suing under the
law, as well, by declaring that plaintiffs under that provision “are in
active concert with the State to enforce S.B. 8.”91
Having cleared out the procedural underbrush, the district court
held that S.B. 8 was likely unconstitutional and that the government
otherwise met the requirements for injunctive relief.92 It entered a
preliminary injunction barring the State of Texas and its officers or
employees from “enforcing [S.B. 8],” including “accepting or
docketing, maintaining, hearing, resolving, awarding damages in,
enforcing judgments in, enforcing any administrative penalties in, and
administering any lawsuit brought pursuant to [S.B. 8].”93 The court
went on to specifically clarify that the order applies to “state court
judges and state court clerks who have the power to enforce or
administer [S.B. 8].”94

86 Id. at *15.
87 Id. at *16. The district court went on to hold that the government also had standing
under the Supreme Court’s ruling in In re Debs, 158 U.S. 564, 584 (1895), in which the
Court allowed the government to sue private parties for an injunction against a labor strike
that impeded interstate commerce. Texas, 2021 WL 4593319, at *17–18.
88 Texas, 2021 WL 4593319, at *20. (“[T]he United States’ cause of action is a creature
of equity, a centuries-old vehicle which eschews categorical definition.”).
89 Id. at *26.
90 Id. at *30.
91 Id. at *33–34 (citing Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 20 (1948)).
92 Id. at *35–51.
93 Id. at *51.
94 Id.
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Based on the district court’s thorough opinion, it appears that
litigation by the United States could be an effective way of challenging
statutes creating private rights of action that violate the U.S.
Constitution. But such federal intervention is rare and governed at
least in part by political considerations. Relegating rightholders to this
approach would render them unable to seek preenforcement review
of statutes in their own right. Moreover, the Fifth Circuit stayed the
district court’s injunction,95 and the Supreme Court allowed the stay to
remain in place,96 potentially calling into question one or more links
in the district court’s chain of reasoning. The Court also granted
certiorari before judgment on the issue of whether the United Sates
could sue in federal court for injunctive or declaratory relief “against
the State, state court judges, state court clerks, other state officials, or
all private parties to prohibit S.B. 8 from being enforced.”97 Several
weeks later, the Court went on to dismiss that writ of certiorari as
improvidently granted without explanation98 (perhaps because it
allowed another case, Whole Woman’s Health v. Jackson,99 to proceed).
As of the time of this writing, United States v. Texas remains pending in
the Fifth Circuit.100 Thus, relying on the government to sue is a
solution that would be applied infrequently, leave people unable to
enforce their own rights, and has been called into question as an
available remedy by the Court.
3. Suing Licensing Authorities
In Whole Woman’s Health v. Jackson, the U.S. Supreme Court
considered federal preenforcement challenges to S.B. 8 that a group
of abortion providers had filed against various defendants.101 The
Court began by holding that state sovereign immunity barred the
plaintiffs from challenging S.B. 8 by suing a state court judge who
could hear cases against them under that law.102 It further declared
that no justiciable controversy existed between the abortion providers
95 United States v. Texas, No. 21–50949, 2021 WL 4786458, at *1 (5th Cir. Oct. 14,
2021), cert. before judgment granted, 142 S. Ct. 14 (2021) (mem.), and cert. dismissed as
improvidently granted, 142 S. Ct. 522 (2021) (mem.) (per curiam).
96 United States v. Texas, 142 S. Ct. 14, 14 (2021) (mem.), cert. dismissed as
improvidently granted, 142 S. Ct. 522 (2021) (mem.) (per curiam).
97 Id.
98 United States v. Texas, 142 S. Ct. 522 (2021) (mem.) (per curiam).
99 142 S. Ct. 522 (2021).
100 United States v. Texas, No. 21-50949 (5th Cir. Jan. 21, 2022) (per curiam) (order
directing additional briefing and oral argument).
101 Whole Woman’s Health v. Jackson, 142 S. Ct. 522, 522 (2021).
102 Id. at 532.
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and any state court clerks who would be responsible for docketing
cases against them under S.B. 8.103 It explained, “Clerks serve to file
cases as they arrive, not to participate as adversaries in those
disputes.”104 The Court went on to discuss the substantial logistical
problems that would arise in attempting to enjoin clerks.105 It also
rejected the plaintiffs’ attempt to sue the Texas attorney general,
noting that he had no authority to enforce S.B. 8.106
A plurality of the Court allowed the plaintiffs’ claims to proceed
against the heads of four state licensing boards and agencies, however,
because those defendants “may or must take enforcement actions”
against the plaintiffs for any violations of S.B. 8.107 Thus, the Court
allowed Whole Woman’s Health to proceed as a traditional
preenforcement Young claim against governmental officials who had
some authority to enforce the challenged legal provision. The Fifth
Circuit, however, has called into question the viability of this approach.
On remand, the Fifth Circuit certified to the Texas Supreme Court the
question of whether state law actually authorizes those licensing boards
and agencies to enforce S.B. 8.108 The Texas Supreme Court held that
“Texas law does not grant the state agency executives named as
defendants in this case any authority to enforce the Act’s requirements,
either directly or indirectly.”109 This ruling creates a substantial risk
that the constitutional challenges in Whole Woman’s Health that the U.S.
Supreme Court allowed to survive will be dismissed. And such “hooks”
for litigation may be unavailable with other statutory causes of action.
4. Suing Potential Private Plaintiffs
In Van Stean v. Texas Right to Life, a Texas state trial court held that
several procedural provisions of S.B. 8 violate the U.S. and Texas
Constitutions.110 Various abortion providers had filed a total of
fourteen state court challenges to S.B. 8 against Texas Right to Life

103 Id.
104 Id.
105 See id. at 533.
106 Id. at 534.
107 Id. at 535 (plurality opinion).
108 See Whole Woman’s Health v. Jackson, 23 F.4th 380, 389 (5th Cir. 2022), mandamus
denied, In re Whole Woman’s Health, 142 S. Ct. 701 (2022) (mem.).
109 Whole Woman’s Health v. Jackson, No. 22-0033, 2022 WL 726990, at *9 (Tex. Mar.
11, 2022).
110 Order Declaring Certain Civil Procedures Unconstitutional and Issuing
Declaratory Judgment at 2, Van Stean v. Tex. Right to Life, No. D-1-GN-21-004179 (Tex.
98th Jud. Dist. Dec. 9, 2021) [hereinafter Van Stean Order]. I am grateful to Professor
Andrew Kull for bringing this case to my attention.
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(TRL) and other defendants who were allegedly acting in concert with
TRL to bring lawsuits under that statute.111 The cases were
consolidated before a single judge for pretrial purposes.112 The
plaintiffs alleged that TRL had “been encouraging persons to file SB 8
lawsuits” and “provid[ing] information to that end.”113 TRL’s website
allegedly “asked for tips about violators, solicited funds, and promised
to ‘sue the abortionists ourselves.’”114 TRL’s alleged actions, the court
concluded, were sufficient to give the plaintiff abortion providers
standing to pursue a preenforcement suit against it.115
Without reaching the substantive abortion-related issues, the
court concluded that three procedural aspects of S.B. 8 are
unconstitutional. First, the statute impermissibly allows “any person”
to sue for statutory damages, regardless of whether that plaintiff
suffered any harm as a result of the statutory violation alleged.116
Permitting lawsuits by people who lack standing to challenge the
legality of a particular abortion violates the Texas Constitution's “open
courts” provision, which generally mirrors Article III's standing
requirements.117 Second, the statute’s authorization of a minimum of
$10,000 in statutory damages constituted “punishment by civil lawsuit,
and deprivation of property, without due process of law as guaranteed
by the Fourteenth Amendment.”118 Such awards of substantial
amounts of money to complete strangers who were not harmed by a
defendant’s actions had “the effect of punishing a defendant rather
than compensating a plaintiff.”119 Finally, in part because a person
could sue under S.B. 8 without having suffered any personal harm, the
court concluded that the statute was an invalid delegation of
enforcement authority to private parties in violation of the state
constitution’s “separation of powers provision.”120 The court concluded by granting a declaratory judgment to the plaintiffs on those issues,
but held that a trial would be needed on their request for a permanent
injunction against TRL.121

111 See In re Tex. Hearbeat [sic] Act Litig., No. 21-0782, at 1 (Multi-District Litig. Panel
Tex. Oct. 14, 2021).
112 Id. at 2.
113 Van Stean Order, supra note 110, at 21.
114 Id. at 22.
115 Id. at 25.
116 See id. at 29.
117 Id. at 30, 36, 47.
118 Id. at 36.
119 Id. at 37 (emphasis omitted).
120 Id. at 43–47.
121 Id. at 47.
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The plaintiffs in Van Stean circumvented sovereign immunity and
other obstacles to preenforcement relief by suing a private entity that
was overtly threatening to sue them and encouraging litigation against
them. This route will seldom be available, however, unless an entity
such as TRL engages in such behavior. Moreover, this suit was brought
in state court, thereby depriving the plaintiffs of an opportunity to have
their federal claims heard in a federal forum.122 Finally, the trial
court’s ruling protects the plaintiffs from suits only by TRL and others
acting in concert with it; they remain liable to suits by anyone else in
the world. On the other hand, in the event TRL chooses to appeal this
ruling to higher courts and loses, the resulting legal opinions may be
able to block subsequent litigation—not only against the Van Stean
plaintiffs, but all rightholders—as a matter of vertical stare decisis.
Thus, this type of state court litigation may be effective under certain
circumstances, but it does not appear to be a categorically adequate
means of seeking preenforcement relief against apparently
unconstitutional laws that are enforceable through private rights of
action.
II.

THE DUE PROCESS RIGHT TO PREENFORCEMENT JUDICIAL
GUIDANCE

Periodically over the years, the U.S. Supreme Court has held that
people whose conduct is regulated by a statute or regulation have the
Due Process right to seek a judicial determination of that provision’s
validity without having to incur substantial liability by violating that
provision.123 The primary way in which courts typically enforce this
right is by allowing rightholders, pursuant to Ex parte Young, to bring
preenforcement challenges against the government officials responsible for enforcing the legal provisions at issue.124 When such relief is
unavailable, however, the Court has enforced this right in other ways.

122 Scholars strenuously disagree over whether state courts are less effective fora than
federal courts for the protection of federal rights. See Burt Neuborne, The Myth of Parity, 90
HARV. L. REV. 1105 (1977).
123 Justice Thomas, however, has stated “there is no freestanding constitutional right
to pre-enforcement review in federal court” because “federal courts generally may not ‘give
advisory rulings on the potential success of an affirmative defense before a cause of action
has even accrued.’” Whole Woman’s Health v. Jackson, 142 S. Ct. 522, 539 (2021) (Thomas,
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (quoting MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech,
Inc., 549 U.S. 118, 142 (2007) (Thomas, J., dissenting)).
124 Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908).
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A. Recognizing the Right
The roots of the Due Process right to preenforcement judicial
guidance trace back to the Court’s 1908 ruling in Ex parte Young.125 In
Young, the state of Minnesota passed a law establishing a railroad
commission to adopt rates for railroad freight transportation within
the state.126 The law specified that any common carrier who violated
the commission’s orders was subject to a fine of up to $10,000 per
offense.127 The commission issued a rate schedule pursuant to this
statute. In April 1907, the legislature subsequently adopted rates for
the transportation of passengers and certain commodities, and
specified that anyone who violated those provisions could be punished
by up to ninety days in jail.128 A group of railroad shareholders sought
an order prohibiting their railroads from following these allegedly
unconstitutional statutes and commission orders, and prohibiting the
commission or state attorney general from enforcing them.129
The plaintiffs raised both substantive and procedural constitutional objections. Substantively, the plaintiffs argued that rates were so
low as to be confiscatory, thereby unconstitutionally depriving their
railroads of property without due process of law.130 Procedurally, the
plaintiffs claimed that the law also violated due process and equal
protection by failing to provide a mechanism through which a railroad
could seek judicial review of the rates’ validity without exposing itself
to substantial liability by violating the statute or a rate order.131 The
125 Id. at 123.
126 Id. at 127.
127 Id.
128 Id. at 145.
129 Id. at 148.
130 Id. at 143–44. Substantive constitutional law at the time recognized that “[t]he
sufficiency of rates with reference to the Federal Constitution is a judicial question . . . .”
Id.; see also Miss. R.R. Comm’n v. Mobile & Ohio R.R. Co., 244 U.S. 388, 391 (1917) (“If this
power of regulation is exercised in such an arbitrary or unreasonable manner as to prevent
the company from obtaining a fair return upon the property invested in the public service
it passes beyond lawful bounds, and such action is void, because repugnant to the due
process of law provision of the Fourteenth Amendment . . . .”); R.R. Comm’n Cases, 116
U.S. 307, 331 (1886) (“Under pretence of regulating fares and freights, the State cannot
require a railroad corporation to carry persons or property without reward; neither can it
do that which in law amounts to a taking of private property for public use without just
compensation, or without due process of law.”).
131 See Ex parte Young, 209 U.S.123, 144–45 (1908); see also Ohio Valley Water Co. v.
Ben Avon Borough, 253 U.S. 287, 289 (1920) (“[I]f the owner claims confiscation of his
property will result [from an administrative order], the State must provide a fair
opportunity for submitting that issue to a judicial tribunal for determination upon its own
independent judgment as to both law and facts; otherwise the order is void because in
conflict with the due process clause . . . .”).
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statute’s “enormous penalties” prevented railroads and their
employees “from resorting to the courts for the purpose of
determining the [statute’s] validity.”132 A railroad was accordingly left
with the choice of either implementing the potentially
unconstitutional rates, which (if they actually were invalid) would
result in the unconstitutional confiscation of its property, or violating
the statute to assert constitutional defenses “at the risk, if mistaken, of
being subjected to such enormous penalties.”133
The trial court entered a preliminary injunction barring the
Northern Pacific Railway Company (“Northern Pacific”) from
complying with the rates set by the legislature in the April 1907 statute,
and the attorney general from enforcing those rates against the
railroad.134 The next day, the attorney general obtained a writ of
mandamus from state court ordering Northern Pacific to comply with
the rates in the April 1907 statute.135 He argued that the Eleventh
Amendment deprived the federal district court of jurisdiction to enter
its injunction against him since he was a state officer enforcing a state
statute.136 The federal district court held the attorney general in
contempt for violating the injunction, and he appealed his contempt
conviction directly to the U.S. Supreme Court.137
The Supreme Court began by holding that fundamental due
process principles required that the railroad have some mechanism for
obtaining a judicial determination of the rates’ constitutionality
without running the risk of violating them and facing potentially
significant legal consequences. The Court declared that the railroad’s
“officers and employees could not be expected to disobey any of the
provisions of the acts or orders at the risk of such fines and penalties
being imposed upon them, in case the court should decide that the
law was valid.”138 If the railroad had to violate the statute to raise its
constitutional challenge, “[t]he necessary effect and result of such
legislation must be to preclude a resort to the courts (either state or
Federal) for the purpose of testing [the law’s] validity. . . . The result
would be a denial of any hearing to the company.”139 The Court held
132 Young, 209 U.S. at 144.
133 Id. at 144–45. The plaintiffs also raised a third constitutional argument which the
Court did not address: the rates violated the Dormant Commerce Clause by interfering with
interstate commerce. Id. at 145.
134 Id. at 132–33. The court did not enjoin the commission’s earlier orders regarding
freight transportation rates, however. See id.
135 Id. at 133.
136 Id. at 132.
137 Id.
138 Id. at 146.
139 Id. (emphasis added).
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that a law which requires a person to risk incurring substantial
penalties in order to test its validity is unconstitutional.140 The threat
of such substantial liability is equivalent to a complete—and
unconstitutional141—denial of judicial review of the underlying
restrictions.142
The Court concluded that the statutory provisions “imposing such
enormous fines and possible imprisonment as a result of an unsuccessful effort to test the validity of the laws themselves, are unconstitutional
on their face, without regard to the question of the insufficiency of
those rates.”143 In other words, putting aside whether the statute’s
substantive restrictions were themselves unconstitutional, the law was
independently unconstitutional due to the absence of any mechanism
for preenforcement judicial review of the validity of its restrictions.
Later in the opinion, the Court added that subjecting a
rightholder to the possibility of repeated litigation for multiple
violations of an allegedly unconstitutional law would constitute
irreparable harm which a federal court may enjoin.144 The Court
rejected the notion that the railroad had an adequate remedy at law by
simply violating the statute on a single occasion and then raising its
constitutional claims as a defense in any ensuing prosecution or other
enforcement proceeding.145 The Court noted that a prosecutor might
140 Id. at 147 (“A law which . . . impos[es] such conditions upon the right to appeal for
judicial relief as works an abandonment of the right rather than face the conditions upon
which it is offered or may be obtained, is also unconstitutional.”).
141 The Court had previously held that a law making “the decision of the legislature or
of a commission conclusive as to the sufficiency of [railroad] rates” is “unconstitutional.”
Id. (citing Chi., Milwaukee & St. Paul Ry. Co. v. Minnesota, 134 U.S. 418 (1890)); see also St.
Louis & S.F. Ry. Co. v. Gill, 156 U.S. 649, 657–58 (1895); R.R. Comm’n Cases, 116 U.S. 307,
331 (1886).
142 Young, 209 U.S. at 147 (“[W]hen the penalties for disobedience are by fines so
enormous and imprisonment so severe as to intimidate the company and its officers from
resorting to the courts to test the validity of the legislation, the result is the same as if the
law in terms prohibited the company from seeking judicial construction of laws which
deeply affect its rights.”).
143 Id. at 148; see also Cotting v. Kan. City Stock Yards Co., 183 U.S. 79, 102 (1901)
(“[W]hen the legislature, in an effort to prevent any inquiry of the validity of a particular
statute, so burdens any challenge thereof in the courts, that the party affected is necessarily
constrained to submit rather than take the chances of the penalties imposed, then it
becomes a serious question whether the party is not deprived of the equal protection of the
laws.”).
144 See Young, 209 U.S. at 160 (“It would be an injury to complainant to harass it with a
multiplicity of suits or litigation generally in an endeavor to enforce penalties under an
unconstitutional enactment, and to prevent it ought to be within the jurisdiction of a court
of equity.”).
145 Id. at 163 (rejecting the suggestion that “the proper way to test the constitutionality
of the act is to disobey it, at least once, after which the company might obey the act pending
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refrain from bringing charges after a single violation.146 And even if
the prosecutor decided to take immediate action, it could take several
years for the railroad to obtain a final judgment concerning its rights;
during that time, it would have been subject to potentially
unconstitutional restrictions.147 Moreover, the magnitude of the
penalties might deter the company and its employees from being
willing to violate the law, even on a single occasion, to bring a test
case.148 The Court declared:
To await proceedings against the company in a state court
grounded upon a disobedience of the act, and then, if necessary,
obtain a review in this court by writ of error to the highest state
court, would place the company in peril of large loss and its agents
in great risk of fines and imprisonment if it should be finally
determined that the act was valid. This risk the company ought not to
be required to take.149

The Court later added that a preenforcement suit for equitable relief
was “undoubtedly the most convenient, the most comprehensive and
the most orderly way in which the rights of all parties can be properly,
fairly and adequately passed upon.”150
Over the decade that followed, the Supreme Court repeatedly
reaffirmed that, when the government regulates private parties’
conduct, the Due Process Clause requires it to provide a mechanism
through which such parties may seek judicial review of the validity of
those regulations without subjecting themselves to the risk of
substantial penalties. In 1913, for example, the Court held that “penal
provisions operating to preclude” a “fair opportunity to test the
constitutional validity” of a legal provision such as a “prescribed
rate . . . would be invalid.”151 Two years later, the Court confirmed that
subsequent proceedings to test its validity”); see also id. at 164–65 (“Suits for penalties, or
indictment or other criminal proceedings for a violation of the act, would therefore furnish
no reasonable or adequate opportunity for the presentation of a defense founded upon the
assertion that the rates were too low and therefore the act invalid.”); Miss. R.R. Comm’n v.
Mobile & Ohio R.R. Co., 244 U.S. 388, 392 (1917) (holding that “the appropriate remedy”
for determining whether a state law or a railroad commission order violated the Fourteenth
Amendment “is a bill in equity such as was filed in this case [in federal court] to enjoin its
enforcement”).
146 Young, 209 U.S. at 163.
147 Id.
148 Id. at 163–64. The Court also pointed out that the type of evidence the railroad
would have to introduce in a criminal trial to show that the rates were confiscatorily low was
far removed from the central issue of its guilt in that case. Id. at 164.
149 Id. at 165 (emphasis added).
150 Id. at 166.
151 Chesapeake & Ohio Ry. Co. v. Conley, 230 U.S. 513, 521–22 (1913) (holding that
the challenged statute accorded the plaintiff railroad due process because the state
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a plaintiff “would be entitled to protection against the imposition of
such penalties as would virtually deny access to the courts for the
protection of rights guaranteed by the Federal Constitution.”152 This
right to preenforcement judicial guidance is at its apex where the
prospect of repeated enforcement actions for a course of conduct
raises the specter of substantial cumulative liability.153
B. Enforcing the Right to Guidance in Young
The previous Section discussed the Supreme Court’s recognition
of the due process right to preenforcement judicial guidance
concerning a legal provision’s validity. Young enforced this right by
allowing a regulated entity to bring a preenforcement federal suit
against the state officers responsible for implementing an allegedly
unconstitutional legal provision to allow the court to determine the

supreme court had construed the statute as protecting the railroad from the accumulation
of penalties while it was challenging the statute’s constitutionality); see also W. Union Tel.
Co. v. City of Richmond, 224 U.S. 160, 172 (1912) (upholding ordinance imposing penalties
of up to $500 per pole on a weekly basis for poles that a telegraph company fails to remove
after local officials order it to do so, because “[i]t does not look as if the penalties in this
ordinance were established with a view to prevent the appellant from resorting to the
Federal courts . . . and if an oppressive application of them should be attempted it will be
time enough then for the appellant to [challenge it]”); Pennsylvania v. West Virginia, 262
U.S. 553, 614–15 (1923) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (urging that, because the state regulatory
commission’s orders did not go into effect for 30 days after issuance in order to allow time
for judicial review, “there could never be occasion for invoking in respect to this statute the
doctrine of Ex parte Young”).
152 Wathen v. Jackson Oil & Refin. Co., 235 U.S. 635, 640 (1915) (holding that a
shareholder lacked standing to seek an injunction barring a corporation from following an
allegedly unconstitutional maximum-hours law, since the corporation would be protected
from penalties if it violated the law in order to bring a constitutional challenge); see also
United States ex rel. Milwaukee Soc. Democratic Publ’g Co. v. Burleson, 255 U.S. 407, 431
n.1 (1921) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (“[A] statute prescribing similar penalties for failure
to observe its provisions or the order of a public service commission, although made after
full hearing, is a deterrent so potent as to amount to a denial of the right to a judicial review,
and operate as a taking of property without due process of law . . . .”).
153 See, e.g., Nat. Gas Pipeline Co. v. Slattery, 302 U.S. 300, 310 (1937) (“As the Act
imposes penalties of from $500 to $2,000 a day for failure to comply with the order, any
application of the statute subjecting appellant to the risk of the cumulative penalties
pending an attempt to test the validity of the order in the courts and for a reasonable time
after decision, would be a denial of due process.”); see also Morales v. Trans World Airlines,
Inc., 504 U.S. 374, 381 (1992) (holding that regulated entities were entitled to seek
preenforcement relief against state officers to enjoin state laws that were allegedly
preempted by a federal law, in part because the state law “imposes additional liability (by
way of civil penalties and consumer treble-damages actions) for multiple violations”).
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provision’s constitutionality.154 Such plaintiffs could seek both a
temporary injunction granting “freedom from suits, civil or criminal”
while the court was considering its claims, as well as a permanent
injunction “restraining all such actions or proceedings” should it
ultimately prevail.155
The Court rejected the argument that a suit to enjoin a state
official from enforcing an allegedly unconstitutional state law is
actually brought against the state itself and therefore prohibited by
state sovereign immunity. Enforcement of an unconstitutional law, the
Court explained, neither involves the exercise of state authority nor
“affect[s] the State in its sovereign or governmental capacity.”156
Rather, attempts to enforce unconstitutional laws are simply “illegal
act[s]” by state officials.157
An official who implements an
unconstitutional law is “stripped of his official or representative
character and is subjected in his person to the consequences of his
individual conduct.”158 Thus, state sovereign immunity does not bar
preenforcement constitutional suits for injunctive relief against state
officials.159
Morales v. Trans World Airlines, Inc. is a modern example of a
typical preenforcement constitutional challenge under Young.160
Texas had adopted consumer protection and other related statutes
that could be enforced either by the state attorney general or private
consumers.161 Those laws allowed for “civil penalties and consumer
treble-damages actions.”162 The Texas attorney general threatened to
sue several airlines for violating those provisions because their
advertisements did not disclose certain surcharges.163 In response, the
154 See also Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co. v. Garrett, 231 U.S. 298, 311 (1913) (“If the
Commission establishes rates that are so unreasonably low as to be confiscatory, an
appropriate mode of obtaining relief is by bill in equity to restrain the enforcement of the
order. . . . Presumably, the courts of the State, as well as the Federal courts, would be open
to the carrier for this purpose . . . without express statutory provision to that effect.” (first
citing Chi., Milwaukee & St. Paul Ry. Co. v. Minnesota, 134 U.S. 418, 459, 460 (1890); then
citing St. Louis & S.F. Ry. Co. v. Gill, 156 U.S. 649, 659, 666 (1895); then citing Ex parte
Young, 209 U.S. at 163; and then citing Home Tel. & Tel. Co. v. City of L.A., 211 U.S. 265,
278 (1908))).
155 Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 149 (1908).
156 Id. at 159.
157 Id.
158 Id. at 160.
159 Id. at 149, 155–56.
160 Morales v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 504 U.S. 374, 380–81 (1992).
161 Id. at 381 (citing TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN. §§ 17.47, 17.50 (1987 & Supp. 1991–
92)).
162 Id.
163 Id. at 379–80.
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airlines sued the Texas attorney general in federal court for an
injunction barring him from enforcing those laws and a declaratory
judgment that, as applied to airlines’ advertisements, they are
preempted by the federal Airline Deregulation Act of 1978.164
The U.S. Supreme Court held that the airlines’ suit was valid and
not barred by the Eleventh Amendment.165 The Court explained that
the attorney general “had made clear that [he] would seek to enforce”
state law against the airlines for their advertisements.166 The airlines
faced potentially substantial liability “for multiple violations.”167 The
Court explained that, as in Young, the airlines would otherwise be
“faced with a Hobson’s choice: continually violate the Texas law and
expose themselves to potentially huge liability; or violate the law once
as a test case and suffer the injury of obeying the law during the
pendency of the proceedings and any further review.”168 The Court
did not even mention the even more extreme alternative that the
airlines could be completely chilled by the statute’s penalties and
refrain from violating it even to bring a test case.
Historically, one recurring obstacle to some Young suits was not
the Eleventh Amendment or sovereign immunity, but rather the
absence of irreparable harm to the plaintiff. A plaintiff must show that
it faces imminent or ongoing irreparable injury to obtain injunctive
relief.169 Some early precedents hold that a plaintiff facing the
possibility of limited and nonrecurring statutory damages may not be
at risk of irreparable injury, and therefore might be unable to obtain
an injunction. In Spielman Motor Sales Co. v. Dodge, for example, the
Court affirmed the dismissal of a car dealership’s petition for a
preliminary injunction against enforcement of a state law regulating
used car sales that allegedly violated the federal Due Process Clause.170
The Court held that the dealership did not face irreparable harm from
the threat of criminal prosecution under the law.171 It explained that
the dealership was a large business, the statute carried only a $500 fine,
and the district attorney had promised not to pursue more than a
single prosecution against the dealership until the law’s validity were

164 Id. at 380 (citing 49 U.S.C. app. § 1305(a)(1)).
165 Id. at 381 (“We think Young establishes that injunctive relief was available here.”).
166 Id.
167 Id.
168 Id.
169 See Winter v. Nat’l Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008) (preliminary
injunctions); eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 391 (2006) (permanent
injunctions).
170 Spielman Motor Sales Co. v. Dodge, 295 U.S. 89, 91, 97 (1935).
171 Id. at 95–96.
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established.172 In general, however, a person who has not yet violated
a statute may typically rely on the chilling effect to their constitutional
rights to establish the irreparable injury needed for a preliminary or
permanent injunction.173
Younger abstention sometimes impedes rightholders’ access to
federal courts. The Court’s 1971 ruling in Younger v. Harris requires
federal courts to generally abstain from adjudicating federal constitutional challenges to state legal provisions if a criminal prosecution has
already commenced in state court.174 Younger abstention applies
regardless of whether a rightholder pursues injunctive or declaratory
relief in federal court.175 The Court later expanded the scope of this
preemption, allowing it to be triggered by at least certain types of
government-initiated civil litigation,176 as well as state enforcement
proceedings that commence shortly after a plaintiff seeks
preenforcement relief in federal court.177 Rightholders may overcome
172 Id. The Spielman Court emphasized that the dealership’s allegations concerning its
constitutional claim were terse and conclusory. Id.; see also Beal v. Mo. Pac. R.R. Corp., 312
U.S. 45, 48–50 (1941) (holding in a diversity case that the plaintiff railroad was not entitled
to an injunction barring future state-law prosecutions on the grounds its conduct did not
violate state law, in part because the state attorney general had agreed to pursue only “a
single test suit . . . in the state courts” and the railroad accordingly did not face a
“multiplicity of prosecutions and risk that the aggregate fines . . . would be very large”).
173 See Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225, 242 (1972) (“[F]ederal injunctive relief against
a state court proceeding can in some circumstances be essential to prevent great,
immediate, and irreparable loss of a person’s constitutional rights.” (citing Ex parte Young,
209 U.S. 123 (1908))); see also Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 373 (1976) (plurality opinion)
(“The loss of First Amendment freedoms, for even minimal periods of time, unquestionably
constitutes irreparable injury.”); Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479, 486 (1965) (stating
that irreparable harm occurs when requiring rightholders to “await the state court’s
disposition and ultimate review in this Court of any adverse determination” would cause “a
substantial loss or impairment of freedoms of expression”).
174 Younger v. Harris 401 U.S. 37, 45–46 (1971) (holding that federal courts generally
should not enjoin ongoing state criminal prosecutions, even if the underlying criminal
statute is unconstitutional, because the rightholder has an adequate remedy at law by raising
their constitutional defense in state court).
175 Samuels v. Mackell, 401 U.S. 66, 72 (1971) (“[O]rdinarily a declaratory judgment

will result in precisely the same interference with and disruption of state proceedings
that the long-standing policy limiting injunctions was designed to avoid.”).
176 Trainor v. Hernandez, 431 U.S. 434, 444 (1977) (“[T]he principles of Younger and
Huffman are broad enough to apply to interference by a federal court with an ongoing civil
enforcement action such as this, brought by the State in its sovereign capacity . . . .”); see
also Moore v. Sims, 442 U.S. 415, 430–31, 434–35 (1979) (applying Younger abstention in
federal challenge due to pending family-court proceedings arising under the allegedly
unconstitutional state law); Juidice v. Vail, 430 U.S. 327, 333, 337 (1977) (applying Younger
abstention based on pending state court contempt proceedings).
177 See Hicks v. Miranda, 422 U.S. 332, 349 (1975) (“[W]here state criminal
proceedings are begun against the federal plaintiffs after the federal complaint is filed but
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Younger abstention by showing that they face the risk of a multiplicity
of repetitive lawsuits, are suffering bad-faith harassment, or the legal
provision they violated was clearly facially unconstitutional.178
In contrast, the Declaratory Judgment Act of 1934179 made it easier
for rightholders to seek preenforcement review of the constitutionality
of legal provisions without violating them.180 The Act offered relief to
plaintiffs who could not satisfy the traditional equitable requirements
for obtaining an injunction, including demonstrating irreparable
harm.181 A plaintiff may seek a declaratory judgment as to the
constitutionality of a state law, regardless of whether injunctive relief is
available, “when no state prosecution is pending and a federal plaintiff
demonstrates a genuine threat of enforcement.”182 Thus, Young
generally allows plaintiffs to seek injunctions or declaratory judgments
against the government officials responsible for enforcing allegedly
unconstitutional legal provisions without exposing themselves to
potentially substantial liability. However, its exception to sovereign
immunity, as traditionally applied, offers no protection against legal
provisions enforced through private rights of action.183

before any proceedings of substance on the merits have taken place in the federal court,
the principles of Younger v. Harris should apply in full force.”).
178 Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd., 420 U.S. 592, 611 (1975). The Court has explained that
a rightholder faces irreparable injury from the threat of a multiplicity of suits only where
there is a risk of “numerous suits between the same parties, involving the same issues of law
or fact. [This doctrine] does not extend to cases where there are numerous parties plaintiff
or defendant, and the issues between them and the adverse party are not necessarily
identical.” Matthews v. Rodgers, 284 U.S. 521, 529–30 (1932) (holding that businesses
could not seek injunctive relief in federal court against collection of a state tax on the
grounds it unconstitutionally burdened interstate commerce); see, e.g., Wooley v. Maynard,
430 U.S. 705, 712 (1977) (finding irreparable injury where the plaintiff faced “three
successive prosecutions . . . in the span of five weeks” under the challenged state law
governing license plates).
179 Declaratory Judgment Act, Pub. L. No. 73-343, ch. 512, 48 Stat. 955 (1934) (codified
as amended at 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201–02 (2018)).
180 See S. REP. NO. 73-1005, at 2–3 (1934) (explaining that declaratory judgments
“[are] especially useful in avoiding the necessity, now so often present, of having to act at
one’s peril or to act on one’s own interpretation of his rights, or abandon one’s rights
because of a fear of incurring damages”); see also Perez v. Ledesma, 401 U.S. 82, 111 (1971)
(Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (stating that the Act did not “in any
way diminish[] the continuing vitality of Ex parte Young with respect to federal
injunctions”).
181 See Perez, 401 U.S. at 121–23.
182 Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452, 475 (1974); see also Perez, 401 U.S. at 115 (“The
legislative history of the Federal Declaratory Judgment Act is overwhelming that declaratory
judgments were to be fully available to test the constitutionality of state and federal criminal
statutes.”).
183 See infra notes 211–21 and accompanying text.
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OVERCOMING THE LIMITS OF EX PARTE YOUNG

When a statute imposes an allegedly unconstitutional restriction
that is enforceable solely through a private right of action, there is no
government official to sue for preenforcement relief in a traditional
suit under Young. Rightholders therefore need an alternate way to
exercise their due process right to obtain a judicial ruling about the
law’s validity without incurring potentially substantial liability, which
Young also recognized.184 In Whole Woman’s Health,185 the Supreme
Court appears to have shut the door on bringing preenforcement
challenges by suing judicial personnel, including state judges and
court clerks.186 A more direct approach would be for the Court to
instead expand Young’s exception to state sovereign immunity to allow
preenforcement suits against statutory private rights of action to be
brought against a designated state official, such as the governor or
attorney general. This strategy would require substantial revision not
only to sovereign immunity precedent, but justiciability and (likely) res
judicata doctrine, as well. The current Court appears unlikely to adopt
such major reforms.
A. Preenforcement Suits Against Judicial Personnel
The plaintiffs in Whole Woman’s Health sought to apply Ex parte
Young in a somewhat novel way.187 Among their other claims, they
challenged S.B. 8’s constitutionality by seeking an injunction barring
Texas state judges from adjudicating cases under the statute and Texas
court clerks from docketing such cases.188 It appears that none of the
Justices were willing to go so far as to permit the claims against state
court judges to proceed.189
Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Sotomayor, who each issued
their own opinions concurring in part and dissenting in part, would
have allowed the claims against state court clerks to proceed,

184 See supra notes 143–50 and accompanying text.
185 142 S. Ct. 522, 531–32 (2021) (majority opinion).
186 See supra notes 102–05 and accompanying text.
187 Whole Woman’s Health v. Jackson, 142 S. Ct. 522 (2021).
188 See id. at 531–32.
189 Id. at 531–34; see also id. at 539 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (concluding that the
plaintiffs could not sue any of the defendant government officials); id. at 544 (Roberts, C.J.,
concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part) (“Judges are in no sense adverse
to the parties subject to the burdens of S. B. 8.”); see also id. at 548 (Sotomayor, J., concurring
in the judgment in part and dissenting in part) (opining that state court clerks are proper
defendants, without mentioning state court judges).
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however.190 Roberts reasoned that, because the threat of state court
litigation under S.B. 8 chills the exercise of constitutional rights, “the
court clerks who issue citations and docket S. B. 8 cases are unavoidably
enlisted in the scheme to enforce [the statute] . . . and thus are
sufficiently ‘connect[ed]’ to such enforcement to be proper
defendants.”191 In other words, the clerks “‘set[] in motion the
machinery’ that imposes these burdens on those sued under S. B. 8.”192
Justice Sotomayor reached a similar conclusion.193
The majority, in contrast, held that the same reasoning applied to
both state court clerks and state court judges: neither was adverse to
people who might be sued under allegedly unconstitutional state laws
like S.B. 8.194 It pointed out that Young itself had declared that “‘an
injunction against a state court’ or its ‘machinery’ would be a violation
of the whole scheme of our Government.”195 State court clerks
generally are not permitted to refuse to file complaints based on
defects in their merits.196 And recognizing clerks as proper defendants
could not only open them up to being sued across a range of
constitutional cases, but require them to “assemble a blacklist of
banned claims subject to immediate dismissal,” which the majority
implied was impracticable.197 Thus, the Court rejected the opportunity
to allow plaintiffs to seek preenforcement relief against statutory
private rights of action by suing state court personnel.
B. The Barriers to Expanding Ex Parte Young
There is a more direct potential way to enable preenforcement
judicial review of allegedly unconstitutional laws that are enforceable
only through private litigation: the Court could expand the scope of
Young’s limits on sovereign immunity.198 Such a strategy would be very
difficult, however. It not only raises serious questions concerning
190 Justices Kagan and Breyer joined in both Roberts’ and Sotomayor’s opinions. See
id. at 543 (Roberts, C.J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part); id. at
545 (Sotomayor, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part).
191 Id. at 544 (Roberts, C.J., concurring in the judgment part and dissenting in part)
(second alteration in original) (quoting Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 157 (1908)).
192 Id. (quoting Sniadach v. Fam. Fin. Corp. of Bay View, 395 U.S. 337, 338 (1969)).
193 Id. at 548 (Sotomayor, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part)
(“S. B. 8’s formidable chilling effect, even before suit, would be nonexistent if not for the
state-court officials who docket S. B. 8 cases with lopsided procedures and limited
defenses.”).
194 Id. at 532 (majority opinion).
195 Id. (quoting Young, 209 U.S. at 163).
196 Id.
197 Id. at 533.
198 See supra note 150 and accompanying text.
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justiciability and res judicata, but would require overturning
longstanding precedent governing sovereign immunity.
Young dealt with a particular type of statute—laws enforceable by
government officials. The Court recognized an exception to state
sovereign immunity, allowing plaintiffs to sue state officials in federal
court to enjoin them from enforcing such measures.199 As the Court
explained, the enforcement of an unconstitutional law “is a
proceeding without the authority of and one which does not affect the
State in its sovereign or governmental capacity.”200 This principle may
be broad enough to support a somewhat comparable exception to state
sovereign immunity for lawsuits against an appropriate state official
challenging allegedly unconstitutional laws that are enforceable
through a private right of action.201
The most basic question is whether there is any appropriate
potential defendant for such a lawsuit. Some possible defendants
would be the governor, as the state’s chief executive, or the attorney
general, as the state’s chief law enforcement officer.202 This theory
would be premised on the notion that private rights of action are
simply one means of enforcing the law. The Court would treat the
head of the executive branch or the chief law enforcement officer as
an appropriate defendant in a constitutional challenge, even though
those officials lack authority to directly implement the challenged
measures.
Under this approach, if a rightholder obtained a declaratory
judgment that a legal provision was unconstitutional, the challenged
provision could not be enforced against that rightholder in any way,
including by private parties. If the rightholder brought a Rule
23(b)(2) class action on behalf of similarly situated people or entities,
that victory would benefit other rightholders, as well. And if an

199 Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 148 (1908).
200 Id. at 159.
201 See Morley, supra note 3, at 41–46.
202 An alternative theory for suing the governor, in particular, would be that the
governor’s decision to either sign the bill, or refrain from vetoing the bill and allow it to
enter into law without her signature, allowed the measure to take legal effect, thereby
chilling the exercise of constitutional rights. This argument would provide a concrete way
in which the governor played a role in causing the harm created by the statute. Young,
however, identifies the threat of a statute’s enforcement, rather than its enactment, as the
source of irreparable harm to rightholders. And justiciability doctrine is framed primarily
in terms of whether a person faces a risk of enforcement. See Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497
(1961). Shifting the focus of constitutional litigation to the enactment of allegedly
unconstitutional legal provisions would likely be a much more substantial doctrinal change
than is necessary to allow preenforcement suits against private rights of action if the Court
were inclined to authorize such suits in the first place.
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appellate court held the provision unconstitutional, its ruling would
also have vertical stare decisis effect within that court system,
protecting third-party nonlitigants.
Under this reasoning, when a statute creates a private right of
action, a potential plaintiff derives its right to sue under that law from
the state. The plaintiff’s entitlement to sue depends on the state’s
power to authorize such lawsuits. If a court determines that the state
lacks such authority, then the state’s authorization to private plaintiffs
is invalid. Because a statutory private right of action can fairly be seen
as a delegation of enforcement power from the government to private
plaintiffs, a ruling that the government lacks the authority to adopt the
underlying restrictions in the first place can justly be applied against
the purported delegates of that power (i.e., potential plaintiffs under
that statute).
This approach has been unsuccessful in the modern circuit level
cases in which it has been invoked.203 It faces three main obstacles.
First, under current doctrine, a plaintiff likely lacks standing to sue a
governor or attorney general to prevent private enforcement of a law,
since those officials are not responsible for any such enforcement. The
plaintiff would be suing the governor or attorney general to protect
against litigation by private third parties rather than by the defendants
themselves. The Court would probably find that such an indirect
approach to causation and redressability does not satisfy Article III’s
requirements.204
Second, relatedly, it is doubtful whether future potential plaintiffs
would be bound as a matter of res judicata by a declaratory judgment
against the state executive. In Taylor v. Sturgell, the Court enforced
strict due process limits on the extent to which a case’s res judicata
effect extends to third-party nonlitigants.205 In general, “one is not
bound by a judgment in personam in a litigation in which he is not
designated as a party or to which he has not been made a party by
service of process.”206 Taylor recognized that, “‘in certain limited
203 See supra notes 49–51 and accompanying text.
204 See, e.g., K.P. v. LeBlanc, 729 F.3d 427, 437 (5th Cir. 2013) (holding that plaintiffs
lacked standing to sue state board members to enjoin a law establishing a private right of
action due to lack of redressability, because “enjoining the Board Parties from ‘enforcing’
the cause of action would not address their role in administering the Fund”); Hope Clinic
v. Ryan, 249 F.3d 603, 606 (7th Cir. 2001) (“Because the public officials named as
defendants could not cause the plaintiffs any injury by enforcing the statutes’ private-action
provisions . . . the plaintiffs lack standing with respect to these provisions.”); Okpalobi v.
Foster, 244 F.3d 405, 421 (5th Cir. 2001) (en banc); Women’s Health Clinic v. State, 825
So. 2d 1208, 1212 (La. Ct. App. 2002).
205 See Taylor v. Sturgell, 553 U.S. 880, 893 (2008).
206 Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32, 40 (1940).
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circumstances,’ a nonparty may be bound by a judgment because she
was ‘adequately represented by someone with the same interests who
was a party’ to the suit.’”207 It could be argued that the governor or
attorney general who defend a law’s validity share the same interest as
a private plaintiff who wishes to sue under that provision. The Court
has explained, however, that this “adequate representation” doctrine
applies primarily to class representatives and “suits brought by trustees,
guardians, and other fiduciaries.”208 Applying such “adequate
representation” reasoning in this context would be a substantial
extension of traditional preclusion principles.
Finally, with regard to state sovereign immunity, this approach
would reflect not only a substantial expansion of Young, but a
repudiation of a pre-Young case, Fitts v. McGhee,209 which the Young
Court distinguished.210 In Fitts, Alabama had passed a law setting a
maximum toll rate for the Florence Bridge, which crossed the
Tennessee River. The statute provided that the bridge’s owners would
be liable for $20 to any travelers they charged more than the specified
rate.211
The plaintiffs, the owners of the Florence Bridge, sued the
attorney general and county solicitor in federal court.212 They sought
an injunction against the commencement of “any indictment or
criminal proceeding” for violations of the act.213 The Supreme Court
held that the Eleventh Amendment barred the suit. It pointed out that
neither the attorney general nor county solicitor was “expressly
directed to see to [the statute’s] enforcement” or “held any special
relation to the particular statute alleged to be unconstitutional.”214
Rather, this was a “suit against officers of a State merely to test the
constitutionality of a state statute.”215 The Court expressly rejected the
notion that
the constitutionality of every act passed by the legislature could be
tested by a suit against the Governor and the Attorney General,
based upon the theory that the former, as the executive of the State,
was, in a general sense, charged with the execution of all its laws,

207 Taylor, 553 U.S. at 894 (alteration omitted) (quoting Richards v. Jefferson Cnty.,
517 U.S. 793, 798 (1996)).
208 Id. at 894, 896.
209 172 U.S. 516 (1899).
210 Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 156–59 (1908).
211 Fitts, 172 U.S. at 517.
212 Id. at 524.
213 Id.
214 Id. at 530.
215 Id.
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and the latter, as Attorney General, might represent the State in
litigation involving the enforcement of its statutes.216

The Court acknowledged that such lawsuits “would be a very
convenient way for obtaining a speedy judicial determination of
questions of constitutional law.”217 This “mode” of litigation, however,
“cannot be applied to the States of the Union” because sovereign
immunity protects them from “be[ing] brought into any court at the
suit of private persons.”218
Young reaffirmed Fitts’ holding that state officers may not be sued
to challenge the constitutionality of a state law that is enforceable solely
by private plaintiffs.219 The Court declared that a person may sue a
state official to enjoin enforcement of an allegedly unconstitutional
law only when that official has “some connection with the enforcement
of the act.”220 Allowing a state official to be sued for injunctive relief
against a statutory private right of action, in contrast, would render that
official “a party as a representative of the State, . . . thereby attempting
to make the State a party.”221 Such a maneuver, in the Court’s view,
would strike at the heart of state sovereign immunity.
On the other hand, it may be time for the Court to reexamine this
aspect of sovereign immunity doctrine. More than a century has
elapsed since the Court decided Young (and Fitts). The Court has
recognized that, “[f]or Eleventh Amendment purposes, the line
216 Id.
217 Id.
218 Id.
219 Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 156 (1908) (explaining that the federal claims against
state officials in Fitts were inappropriate because “[t]he penalties for disobeying that act, by
demanding and receiving higher tolls, were to be collected by the persons paying them. No
officer of the State had any official connection with the recovery of such penalties.”).
220 Id. at 157.
221 Id.; see also Mass. State Grange v. Benton, 272 U.S. 525, 527–29 (1926) (opinion of
McReynolds, J.) (holding that the plaintiffs could not seek an injunction against a
Massachusetts law establishing daylight savings time because “no penalty is prescribed for
non-observance” and “no defendant was charged with the duty of enforcement”); cf.
Terrace v. Thompson, 263 U.S. 197, 214 (1923) (“The unconstitutionality of a state law is
not of itself ground for equitable relief in the courts of the United States.”). Lower courts
have held that sovereign immunity protects officials such as a governor or attorney general
from suits challenging the constitutionality of statutory private rights of action. See, e.g.,
Okpalobi v. Foster, 244 F.3d 405, 423 (5th Cir. 2001) (en banc) (holding that the Eleventh
Amendment barred a lawsuit against the governor and attorney general to challenge the
constitutionality of a statutory private right of action because there was no “enforcement
connection” between them and the statute “that satisfies either of the requirements of Ex
Parte Young”); Summit Med. Assocs., P.C. v. Pryor, 180 F.3d 1326, 1342 (11th Cir. 1999)
(“Appellees’ suit against the Governor, the Attorney General, and the District Attorney with
respect to the private civil enforcement provision of the partial-birth abortion statute is
barred by the Eleventh Amendment.”).
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between permitted and prohibited suits will often be indistinct.”222 To
determine whether sovereign immunity prohibits a particular type of
claim, the Court “look[s] to the substance rather than to the form of
the relief sought . . . and will be guided by the policies underlying the
decision in Ex parte Young.”223
Allowing people to challenge the constitutionality of statutory
private rights of action by suing a designated state executive official
would further at least three of the major principles the Young Court
identified. First, most basically, Young “rests on the need to promote
the vindication of federal rights.”224 Suits to enjoin unconstitutional
laws, by definition, seek to “directly end[] [a] violation of federal law,”
rather than merely “indirectly . . . encourag[ing] compliance with
federal law through deterrence” or “meet[ing] third-party interests
such as compensation.”225 The importance of the rights protected by
the Fourteenth Amendment, in particular, “offer a powerful reason to
provide a federal forum.”226
In Idaho v. Coeur d’Alene Tribe of Idaho, the Court reiterated the
importance of vindicating federal rights, even in the context of state
sovereign immunity. It explained that Young’s exception to sovereign
immunity applies “where there is no state forum available to vindicate
federal interests, thereby placing upon Article III courts the special
obligation to ensure the supremacy of federal statutory and
constitutional law.”227 Critically, the Court pointed to the facts of
Young as an example of where a state forum was insufficient to protect
federal rights.
The railroad companies in Young could have “wait[ed] until a
state enforcement proceeding was brought against the railroads and
then test[ed] the [allegedly unconstitutional state] law’s validity by
raising constitutional defenses” in state proceedings.228 Recounting
Young, the Coeur d’Alene Tribe Court pointed out that “the penalties for
violations were so severe a railroad official could not test the law
222 Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 278 (1986); see also Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S.
651, 667 (1974).
223 Papasan, 478 U.S. at 279 (citing Edelman, 415 U.S. at 668); see also Ford Motor Co.
v. Dep’t of Treasury, 323 U.S. 459, 464 (1945) (assessing the “nature and effect of the
proceeding” to determine whether sovereign immunity applies).
224 Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 105 (1984).
225 Papasan, 478 U.S. at 278; see also Green v. Mansour, 474 U.S. 64, 68 (1985)
(“[C]ompensatory or deterrence interests are insufficient to overcome the dictates of the
Eleventh Amendment.”).
226 Idaho v. Coeur d’Alene Tribe of Idaho, 521 U.S. 261, 279 (1997) (Kennedy, J.,
concurring).
227 Id. at 270.
228 Id. at 271.
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without grave risk of heavy fines and imprisonment.”229 In other words,
in the Court’s view, the fact that a rightholder had to violate state law
and risk heavy penalties in order to raise their constitutional claim in
state court meant that “there [was] no available state forum” in which
to litigate that issue.230 Accordingly, rightholders had to be permitted
to pursue their constitutional claim in federal court. “[P]roviding a
federal forum” in such cases, the Court reasoned, is consistent with
“the plan of the [Constitutional] Convention.”231 This same reasoning
would allow a comparable exception to state sovereign immunity to
provide for preenforcement review of state laws establishing private
rights of action.
A second important principle underlying the Court’s sovereign
immunity doctrine is the preservation of “the dignity and respect
afforded a State.”232 Sovereign immunity protects against “[t]he
specific indignity” and “insult to a State of being haled into court
without its consent.”233 To the extent being subject to suit constitutes
an indignity, allowing litigation against a designated executive official
to challenge a statute creating a private right of action may pose less of
a threat to the state’s dignity than a traditional Young suit. If a state
officer loses a traditional Young suit, the state’s officials and agents are
barred from enforcing a state law. If a governor or attorney general
loses in a challenge to a statute creating a private right of action, in
contrast, the law is declared unconstitutional but that official’s conduct
is not impeded.
Moreover, as a practical matter, preenforcement challenges to
statutory private rights of action differ from many other contexts where
sovereign immunity may apply. In many cases, if sovereign immunity
229 Id.
230 Id.
231 Id. Justice O’Connor’s concurrence argues that this standard is too demanding.
Id. at 291–92 (O’Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). Her
concurrence claims the absence of an adequate legal remedy in Young was not relevant to
the sovereign immunity issue, but rather concerned the separate question of whether an
equitable remedy was appropriate. Id. Her opinion also pointed out that pre-Young
precedents had authorized “federal actions to proceed even though a state forum was open
to hear the plaintiff’s claims.” Id. (first citing Reagan v. Farmers’ Loan & Tr. Co., 154 U.S.
362 (1894); and then citing Smyth v. Ames, 169 U.S. 466 (1898)). Emphasizing the
importance of having federal courts adjudicate federal rights, the concurrence advocated a
bright-line, “straightforward” test under which sovereign immunity is inapplicable when “a
complaint alleges an ongoing violation of federal law and seeks relief properly
characterized as prospective.” Id. at 296.
232 Id. at 268 (majority opinion); see also P.R. Aqueduct & Sewer Auth. v. Metcalf &
Eddy, Inc., 506 U.S. 139, 146 (1993) (holding that state sovereign immunity “accords the
States the respect owed them as members of the federation”).
233 Va. Off. for Prot. & Advoc. v. Stewart, 563 U.S. 247, 258 (2011).
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bars a litigant from pursuing a claim against the state or a state official,
the state is protected from having to litigate that issue. In this context,
however, even if sovereign immunity protects a state from having to
defend against a preenforcement challenge to a statute, it has the
opportunity to intervene in private litigation when the statute’s
constitutionality is challenged as a defense.234 To the extent that states
are likely to intervene in private enforcement actions to defend the
constitutionality of their laws, requiring them to do so earlier, at the
preenforcement stage, does not seem particularly disrespectful. As a
practical matter, limiting sovereign immunity would generally wind up
influencing when the state litigates the issue, not whether the state will
do so at all. Of course, one might object that the absence of state
consent makes all the difference. Young, however, already eliminates
sovereign immunity for preenforcement lawsuits challenging the
constitutionality of laws that are enforced by state officials. Extending
Young to preenforcement lawsuits challenging laws enforced by private
parties does not seem materially more disrespectful to states.
Finally, an important goal underlying state sovereign immunity—
though not its central one—is protection of the public fisc.235 Even
when courts grant relief against state officials in their official capacities,
“a federal court’s remedial power, consistent with the Eleventh
Amendment, is necessarily limited to prospective injunctive relief, . . .
and may not include a retroactive award which requires the payment
of funds from the state treasury.”236 Expanding Young to challenges
against laws creating private rights of action would not make states
liable for monetary damages, though § 1988’s provisions concerning
attorneys’ fees would apply.237 The public fisc would remain relatively
undisturbed.
Thus, expanding Young to authorize private litigation against a
governor or attorney general as a representative of the state could be
an effective way of allowing preenforcement challenges to statutory
private rights of action. The current Court seems unlikely, however,
234 See FED. R. CIV. P. 5.1(a)(1)(B), (a)(2) (requiring a party that challenges the
constitutionality of a state law to notify the state attorney general).
235 See Fed. Mar. Comm’n v. S.C. State Ports Auth., 535 U.S. 743, 765 (2002) (“While
state sovereign immunity serves the important function of shielding state treasuries and
thus preserving the States’ ability to govern in accordance with the will of their citizens, . . .
the doctrine’s central purpose is to accord the States the respect owed them as joint
sovereigns.” (quotation marks omitted)).
236 Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 677 (1974) (first citing Ex parte Young 209 U.S.
123 (1908); and then citing Ford Motor Co. v. Dep’t of Treasury 323 U.S. 459 (1945)).
237 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b) (2018); see Missouri v. Jenkins, 491 U.S. 274, 279 (1989) (“[A]n
award of attorney’s fees ancillary to prospective relief is not subject to the strictures of the
Eleventh Amendment.” (citing Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678, 696–97 (1978)).
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to adopt the substantial doctrinal changes this approach would
require. And allowing a plaintiff to sue a state official essentially as a
stand-in for the state as an entity, for the purpose of challenging a law
that the official does not enforce would raise substantial tension with
the core notion that the states themselves are generally immune from
suit.
IV.

PRESERVING THE RIGHT TO GUIDANCE

The Supreme Court has recognized the due process right to
obtain a judicial ruling concerning the constitutionality of a legal
provision without incurring substantial potential liability by violating
it.238 This right applies most directly when a statute is enforced
through substantial fines, penalties, or other sanctions—whether they
are individually substantial, or instead may aggregate to substantial
amounts based on repeated violations.239 This Part introduces the
constitutional tolling doctrine as a way of applying this right to
preenforcement judicial guidance in the context of statutory private
rights of action, then considers a federal statutory fix as a potential
alternative.
A. Constitutional Tolling
Ex parte Young allows regulated entities to vindicate their right to
preenforcement judicial guidance concerning a legal provision’s
validity by bringing a preenforcement suit against the executive
officials charged with enforcing it. When a legal provision is
enforceable only through a private right of action, however, relief
under Young is not presently available because there is no official
responsible for enforcing it. The Court has recognized that, in such
cases, the due process right to preenforcement judicial guidance must
be vindicated through different procedural means.
Where it is impossible to pursue preenforcement judicial review,
the Court has sometimes enforced the right to preenforcement
guidance through the doctrine of “constitutional tolling.”240 This
doctrine provides that a regulated entity may violate a legal provision
and raise its challenge to the measure’s constitutionality as a defense
in any ensuing enforcement proceedings. Critically, even if the court

238 See supra Section II.A.
239 See supra note 153 and accompanying text.
240 The term “constitutional tolling” comes from cases such as United States v. Pacific
Coast European Conference, 451 F.2d 712, 717 (9th Cir. 1971), and Nichiro Gyogyo Kaisha, Ltd.
v. Baldrige, 594 F. Supp. 80, 82 (D.D.C. 1984).
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rejects the constitutional defense, the entity is immune from penalties
for any violations that occurred before the first final judgment on the
constitutional issue.241 Under the constitutional tolling doctrine, the
Court treats a statute’s penalty provisions as severable from the rest of
the measure, and unconstitutional as applied in the context of
enforcement proceedings against a regulated party that lacked any
prior opportunity to challenge the measure’s validity.242
1. The Roots of Constitutional Tolling
The Court applied the constitutional tolling doctrine in the early
Twentieth Century in cases involving state laws that established private
rights of action with substantial penalties. Many of these cases also
involved overlapping concerns about the magnitude of the penalties
involved, laying a preliminary foundation for modern caselaw
imposing due process limits on punitive damages.243 Although this
approach has come to be called the “constitutional tolling” doctrine,
some early cases applied it not only in constitutional cases, but more
broadly to situations in which a regulated entity did not have an

241 See St. Louis, Iron Mountain & S. Ry. Co. v. Williams, 251 U.S. 63, 64–65 (1919)
(“[T]he imposition of severe penalties as a means of enforcing a rate . . . is in contravention
of due process of law, where no adequate opportunity is afforded the carrier for safely
testing, in an appropriate judicial proceeding, the validity of the rate—that is, whether it is
confiscatory or otherwise—before any liability for the penalties attaches.”).
242 See Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co. v. Garrett, 231 U.S. 298, 311 (1913) (“[I]f it were
assumed that these [statutory penalty provisions] would be open to objection as operating
to deprive the carrier of a fair opportunity to contest the validity of the Commission’s action,
still, the penal provisions would be separable, and the force of the remaining portion of the
statute would not be impaired.”); Chesapeake & Ohio Ry. Co. v. Conley, 230 U.S. 513, 521
(1913) (holding that the challenged statute accorded claimed rightholders due process
because the state supreme court had construed it as protecting them from the accumulation
of penalties while they were challenging its constitutionality); cf. Ohio Valley Water Co. v.
Ben Avon Borough, 253 U.S. 287, 291 (1920) (holding that a public service commission
order imposing rates for a water company violated due process because there was no
opportunity for the company to get an independent judicial determination as to whether
the rates were confiscatorily low).
The Court would also assume that cumulative or other substantial penalty provisions
were severable when such sanctions had not been imposed, including in preenforcement
challenges, see, e.g., Wilson v. New, 243 U.S. 332, 351–52 (1917); Phoenix Ry. Co. of Ariz. v.
Geary, 239 U.S. 277, 282–83 (1915); Grand Trunk Ry. Co. v. Mich. R.R. Comm’n, 231 U.S.
457, 473 (1913), and enforcement actions where the government sought only a limited fine
(typically for a single violation of the statute) or injunctive relief, see, e.g., Indep.
Warehouses, Inc. v. Scheele, 331 U.S. 70, 88–89 (1947); Grenada Lumber Co. v. Mississippi,
217 U.S. 433, 443 (1910).
243 See, e.g., BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 568 (1996).
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opportunity to obtain a preenforcement judicial determination of the
legality of its intended actions under a statute.
In Southwestern Telegraph & Telephone Co. v. Danaher,244 for
example, a state law prohibited telephone companies within the state
from imposing discriminatory restrictions on certain customers or
refusing service to any person who offered to comply with its
regulations.245 The law provided penalties for violations of up to $100
daily.246 A phone company had disconnected a patron’s service for
forty days and then denied her a fifty-cent early-payment discount over
the following twenty-three days, because she had been two months in
arrears in paying her phone bill.247 The state supreme court affirmed
that the company had violated the statute and must pay a $6,300
penalty to the customer.248
The U.S. Supreme Court reversed, pointing out that the company
had not engaged in “intentional wrongdoing,” especially since courts
in other jurisdictions had affirmed the right of telephone companies
to cut off service to nonpaying customers.249 The Court further
recognized that “[t]here was no mode of judicially testing the . . .
reasonableness [of the phone company’s actions] in advance of
acting.”250 The Court concluded, “In these circumstances to inflict
upon the company penalties aggregating $6,300 was so plainly
arbitrary and oppressive as to be nothing short of a taking of its
property without due process of law.”251 Thus, the company could not
be subject to substantial penalties in large part because there was no
way for it to obtain a judicial determination of the legality of its
actions—cutting off phone service to nonpaying customers—before it
engaged in them. This case was a particularly expansive application of
tolling principles and the due process right to preenforcement judicial
guidance, since the central question concerned the legality of the
company’s actions rather than a constitutional challenge to the
underlying statute’s substantive restrictions.
Likewise, in Missouri Pacific Railway Co. v. Nebraska, a state law
required railroads to either grant land on their rights-of-way for the
construction of grain elevators, or instead build side tracks connecting

244
245
246
247
248
249
250
251

238 U.S. 482 (1915).
Id. at 485.
Id.
Id. at 486.
Id. at 487–88.
Id. at 490.
Id. at 490–91.
Id. at 491.
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to grain elevators that were adjacent to their rights-of-way.252 Railroads
that failed to comply were liable for $500 in statutory damages.253 A
cooperative grain association sued a railroad for violating the statute,
and the state supreme court affirmed a fine and injunction against the
railroad.254 The U.S. Supreme Court suggested that the statute could
be construed as applying only to “reasonable” requests for track
construction.255 Even with that “strained construction,” however, the
statute subjected railroads that refused to comply with requests from
grain elevator companies to “the peril of a fine, if they turn out wrong
in their guess” as to whether those requests were reasonable.256 The
Court held that a railroad instead must be “allowed a hearing in
advance to decide whether the demand is within the act.”257 Because
there was no way at the time for a railroad to obtain a judicial ruling as
to whether the statute applied to a particular request without
potentially incurring a fine, the Court reversed the state court’s
judgment against the railroad.258
The Court applied similar reasoning to constitutional challenges
to a legal provision in the 1913 case Missouri Pacific Railway Co. v.
Tucker.259 In Tucker, the Kansas legislature adopted maximum rates for
transportation of oil and petroleum by railroad.260 The law did not
provide any opportunity for judicial review of the rates before they
took effect to ensure they were not unconstitutionally confiscatory and
did not otherwise violate the Fourteenth Amendment.261 Under this
rate schedule, the price for a particular shipment should have been
$12, but the railroad charged $3.02 extra.262 The shipper sued under
the statute in state court and won a judgment of $500 in statutory
damages.263
The Court declared that the railroad should not have been put to
the choice of either applying the rates and thereby “sustaining a
serious and irreparable loss” due to decreased income, or violating the
rates and facing “the prescribed liabilities and penalties” if the courts

252
253
254
255
256
257
258
259
260
261
262
263

Mo. Pac. Ry. Co. v. Nebraska, 217 U.S. 196, 204 (1910).
Id. at 204–05.
Id. at 205.
Id. at 207.
Id.
Id. at 207–08.
Id. at 208.
230 U.S. 340 (1913).
Id. at 346.
Id. at 347.
Id. at 346–47.
Id.
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ultimately deemed them valid.264 The state court had rejected the
railroad’s due process claim, pointing out that it could contest the
rates’ validity during any enforcement proceedings.265 Rejecting this
notion, the U.S. Supreme Court held that “the controlling principle”
of Young applied.266 Quoting two lengthy paragraphs from Young, the
Court explained that a rightholder cannot be required to subject itself
to the possibility of “suffer[ing] imprisonment and pay[ing] fines” if
its constitutional challenge to a legal provision is unsuccessful.267
Tucker emphasized that Young’s reasoning was equally applicable
where the legal provision at issue did not authorize imprisonment.268
Thus, the Tucker Court concluded that the railroad could not be held
liable for the substantial statutory fines that accrued while it was
litigating its constitutional defense in a private suit to enforce the
legislature’s rate schedule. 269
The Court also discussed the constitutional tolling doctrine at
length in the 1915 case Wadley Southern Railway Co. v. Georgia.270 In
Wadley, the Georgia Railroad Commission issued an order forbidding
the Wadley Southern Railroad from requiring a certain shipper to
prepay its freight costs while the railroad authorized another shipper
to pay upon delivery.271 The commission fined the railroad $1000 for
violating its order; the underlying statute “authoriz[ed] so enormous
a penalty as $5,000 a day for violating lawful orders of the
Commission.”272 The U.S. Supreme Court held that the commission’s
initial order barring discrimination among shippers was
constitutionally valid.273
The railroad argued, however, that the fine was unconstitutional
because it “operated to prevent an appeal to the courts . . . for the
purpose of determining whether the order was lawful and, therefore,
binding.”274 The Court agreed with the railroad’s premise, holding

264 Id. at 348.
265 Id. at 349.
266 Id. at 350.
267 Id. at 349–50 (quoting Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 147–48 (1908)).
268 Id. at 350–51.
269 Id. at 351.
270 235 U.S. 651 (1915).
271 Id. at 653, 657.
272 Id. at 659.
273 Id. (“[T]here is, of course, nothing in the provisions of the Federal Constitution
which prevents the States from prohibiting and punishing unjust discrimination of its
patrons by a public carrier.”).
274 Id.
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that the railroad was entitled to judicial review of the validity of the
commission’s order without incurring substantial liability.275 It held,
[T]he right to a judicial review must be substantial, adequate, and
safely available—but that right is merely nominal and illusory if the
party to be affected can appeal to the courts only at the risk of
having to pay penalties so great that it is better to yield to orders of
uncertain legality rather than to ask for the protection of the law.276

The Court went on to reiterate, “[U]nder the Constitution penalties
cannot be collected if they operate to deter an interested party from
testing the validity of legislative rates or orders legislative in their
nature.”277
Thus, if the railroad had sought timely judicial review of the
Commission’s order, and the order were deemed valid, the railroad
would not have been subject to penalties for “violations prior to such
adjudication.”278
Because the railroad did not file such a
preenforcement challenge, but instead waited to raise its
constitutional claims as a defense in an enforcement action, the Court
held that it was subject to the statutory penalty.279 Thus, Wadley was
distinguishable from Danaher, Missouri Pacific Railway Co., and Tucker.
Those cases involved state laws that established private rights of action;
there was no obvious route at the time through which the regulated
entities could have sought preenforcement judicial review (such as
through a suit for injunctive relief under Young).280 Wadley, in contrast,
involved fines sought by the state commission; the railroad could have
brought a preenforcement Young claim against the commission’s
members.
As Wadley demonstrates, the main limitation on the constitutional
tolling defense was that it was available only where a regulated entity
lacked a mechanism through which to present its constitutional

275 See id. at 660.
276 Id. at 661.
277 Id. at 662; see also id. at 662–63 (“If a statute could constitutionally impose heavy
penalties for violation of commands of such disputable and uncertain legality the result
inevitably would be that the carrier would yield to void orders, rather than risk the
enormous cumulative or confiscatory punishment that might be imposed if they should
thereafter be declared to be valid.”); Nat. Gas Pipeline Co. v. Slattery, 302 U.S. 300, 310
(1937) (“As the Act imposes penalties of from $500 to $2,000 a day for failure to comply
with the order, any application of the statute subjecting appellant to the risk of the
cumulative penalties pending an attempt to test the validity of the order in the courts and
for a reasonable time after decision, would be a denial of due process.”).
278 Wadley S. R.R., 235 U.S. at 669.
279 Id.
280 This Article argues that the Court should allow for such claims, but is unlikely to
do so. See supra Section III.B.
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arguments to a court, other than as a defense in an enforcement
action. Most obviously, constitutional tolling was inapplicable where a
statute provided for preenforcement judicial review in federal or state
court, or otherwise expressly allowed a regulated entity to avoid fines
and penalties while raising their constitutional defenses.281 Other cases
held that, even if the challenged legal provision did not expressly allow
for some form of preenforcement judicial review, the possibility of
bringing a federal constitutional challenge under Ex parte Young was
enough to render the constitutional tolling doctrine inapplicable.282
Later cases also required rightholders to exhaust administrative
281 See, e.g., Interstate Com. Comm’n v. Atl. Coast Line R. Co., 383 U.S. 576, 603 (1966)
(explaining that the Hepburn Act of 1906 expressly allowed for immediate judicial review
of agency ratemaking orders “to afford an injunctive remedy for persons faced with the
threat of irreparable injury through exposure to liability for mounting penalties without
any other opportunity for judicial review until the Commission or some interested party
should choose to commence enforcement proceedings”); Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S.
414, 437–38 (1944) (“The present statute is not open to the objection that . . . the only
method by which [petitioners] can test the validity of the regulations . . . is by violating the
statute and thus subjecting themselves to the possible imposition of severe and cumulative
penalties. . . . [T]he statute itself provides an expeditious means of testing the validity of
any price regulation, without necessarily incurring any of the penalties of the Act.”); Chi. &
Nw. Ry. Co. v. Ochs, 249 U.S. 416, 421–22 (1919) (upholding order under a state law that
required a railroad to pay most of the cost for a side track to a manufacturing plant that was
being expanded, because the law provided “for a full hearing before the commission and
also in the district court of the county,” rather than requiring the railroad to speculate
about its legal obligations); Gulf, Colo. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. Texas, 246 U.S. 58, 62 (1918)
(affirming a “somewhat extreme” judgment against the railroad because, although “the
statutes of Texas provided for a suit to test the validity of the order [requiring the
appellant’s trains to stop in certain small towns], in a court either of the State or of the
United States,” the railroad “saw fit to await proceedings against it”); S. Pac. Co. v.
Campbell, 230 U.S. 537, 552 (1913) (“The provision of the statute that suit might be
brought in the state court to set aside orders of the commission upon the ground that the
rates fixed were unlawful, or that the regulation or practice prescribed was unreasonable,
did not infringe the rights of the complainants.”); cf. Pac. Live Stock Co. v. Lewis, 241 U.S.
440, 455 (1916) (holding that an administrative order of a state water board could be
implemented while judicial review in state court was pending, particularly since flowing
water is lost if not immediately used and adversely affected parties could post bond to stay
the order’s implementation); Pac. Mail S.S. Co. v. Schmidt, 241 U.S. 245, 249–51 (1916)
(holding, as a matter of statutory interpretation, that a statute requiring a ship owner to pay
per diem penalties to an employee if the owner “neglects” to pay him “without sufficient
cause” did not apply where the ship owner believed in good faith he had a claim for setoff
against the employee).
282 See, e.g., St. Louis, Iron Mountain & S. Ry. Co. v. Williams, 251 U.S. 63, 65–66 (1919)
(holding, in an appeal from an enforcement action in which a railroad was ordered to pay
$100 in penalties in addition to attorneys’ fees for overcharging two passengers sixty-six
cents each, that where a “carrier fails to avail itself of the opportunity” to challenge a
mandatory rate by bringing a “suit in equity,” the state may enforce “substantial penalties
for deviations from it”).
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remedies by asking agencies to postpone or stay their orders pending
adjudication of constitutional claims.283 A regulated entity who
foregoes such opportunities and proceeds with violating the legal
provision is subject to the statutory penalties, regardless of how
substantial they are.284
Some Supreme Court authority suggests that a penalty may be too
small to trigger the constitutional tolling doctrine. That is, the amount
of the fine or other sanction would not deter the reasonable person
from performing acts that violate, or reasonably could be determined
to violate, a statute if they believed their conduct to actually be legal or
constitutionally protected. For example, in the 1934 case Life &
Casualty Insurance Co. v. McCray, the Court upheld a state law requiring
an insurance company to pay a 12% penalty and the plaintiffs’
attorneys fees if it contested coverage and the insured prevailed in
litigation against it, even if the insurance company’s arguments were
made “in good faith and upon reasonable grounds.”285 The Court
explained:
The price of error may be so heavy as to erect an unfair barrier
against the endeavor of an honest litigant to obtain the judgment
of a court. In that event, the Constitution intervenes and keeps the
court room open. . . . On the other hand, the penalty may be no
more than the fair price of the adventure. . . . In that event, the
litigant must pay for his experience, like others who have tried and
lost.286
283 Nat. Gas Pipeline Co., 302 U.S. at 310 (“[N]o reason appears why appellant could
not have asked the commission to postpone the date of operation of the order pending
application to the commission for modification. Refusal of postponement would have been
the occasion for recourse to the courts.”); Yakus, 321 U.S. at 438 (“[W]hile courts have no
power to suspend or ameliorate the operation of a regulation during the pendency of
proceedings to determine its validity, we cannot say that the Administrator has no such
power or assume that he would not exercise it in an appropriate case.”).
284 See Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co. v. Garrett, 231 U.S. 298, 311 (1913) (rejecting
due process challenge to a statute empowering a state commission to establish maximum
railroad rates because “there is no showing here of an attempt to preclude such
[preenforcement] resort to the courts, or to deny to the carrier the assertion of its rights,
unless it can be found in the severity of the penalties attached to disobedience of the
order”).
285 Life & Cas. Ins. Co. v. McCray, 291 U.S. 566, 568–69 (1934).
286 Id. at 574–75 (first citing Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908); then citing Wadley
S. Ry. Co. v. Georgia, 235 U.S. 651, 661, 662 (1915); and then citing St. Louis, Iron Mountain
& S. Ry. Co. v. Williams, 251 U.S. 63 (1919)); see also Overnight Motor Transp. Co. v. Missel,
316 U.S. 572, 583–84 (1942) (upholding validity of a Fair Labor Standards Act provision
allowing successful plaintiffs to recover twice their claimed overtime pay as well as attorneys’
fees because the statute did not involve “a threat of criminal proceedings or prohibitive
fines”), superseded by statute, 29 U.S.C. § 260, as recognized in Trans World Airlines, Inc. v.
Thurston, 469 U.S. 111, 128 n.22 (1985).

1874

NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 97:5

The Court may have been especially willing to uphold this provision
precisely because of the importance of inducing insurance companies
to fulfill their obligations—typically to especially vulnerable or needy
insureds—in a timely manner.287
2. Constitutional Tolling in the Modern Era
Over the past few decades, the Court itself has seldom discussed
the constitutional tolling doctrine. Its primary recognition of the
doctrine in recent years came indirectly in Thunder Basin Coal Co. v.
Reich.288
The plaintiff coal company in that case brought a
preenforcement challenge to the Federal Mine Safety and Health
Amendments Act of 1977.289 The company argued that the statute did
not require it to recognize its nonunion miners’ designation of two
nonemployees as their representatives.290
The company also
maintained that the statutory scheme forced an impermissible choice
upon it. On the one hand, the company could recognize the miners’
allegedly invalid designations, which would purportedly cause the
company irreparable injury.291 On the other hand, the company could
potentially violate the act by rejecting those designations in order to
raise its defense in an enforcement proceeding, leading to “possible
escalating daily penalties” if the company lost.292
The Supreme Court held that the district court lacked subjectmatter jurisdiction over the company’s preenforcement challenge.293
It noted that the act provides for judicial review of the Federal Mine
Safety and Health Review Commission’s orders, including orders to
designate certain representatives, directly in the court of appeals.294
“The structure of the Mine Act,” the Court concluded, “demonstrates
that Congress intended to preclude challenges such as the present
one.”295
287 See Life & Cas. Ins. Co., 291 U.S. at 569–70.
288 510 U.S. 200 (1994); see also St. Regis Paper Co. v. United States, 368 U.S. 208, 226
(1961) (“‘[W]e are not prepared to say that courts would be powerless’ to act where such
orders appear suspect and ruinous penalties would be sustained pending a good faith test
of their validity.” (quoting United States v. Morton Salt Co., 338 U.S. 632, 654 (1950))).
289 Thunder Basin, 510 U.S. at 202 (citing Federal Mine Safety and Health Amendments
Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-164, 91 Stat. 1290 (codified as amended at 30 U.S.C. § 801
(1988))).
290 Id. at 204–05.
291 Id. at 205.
292 Id.
293 Id. at 207.
294 Id.
295 Id. at 208; see also id. at 216 (“Nothing in the language and structure of the Act or
its legislative history suggests that Congress intended to allow mine operators to evade the
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The Court went on to reject the coal company’s due process claim
on the merits, ruling that accepting the miners’ designation of
nonemployee representatives would not cause any irreparable harm to
the company given the limited scope of representatives’
prerogatives.296 Moreover, even if the company chose to violate the
statute, it could seek “temporary relief” from both the commission and
the court of appeals.297 The Court reasoned:
Thus, this case does not present the situation confronted in Ex parte
Young, . . . in which the practical effect of coercive penalties for
noncompliance was to foreclose all access to the courts. Nor does
this approach a situation in which compliance is sufficiently
onerous and coercive penalties sufficiently potent that a
constitutionally intolerable choice might be presented. 298

Although the Thunder Basin Coal Co. Court found the constitutional
tolling doctrine inapplicable, its reasoning appears to recognize the
doctrine’s continuing validity.299
In the modern era, the doctrine has been applied primarily within
the Ninth Circuit, and to a lesser extent in a few other circuits, as
well.300 In the Ninth Circuit’s 1971 case United States v. Pacific Coast

statutory-review process by enjoining the Secretary from commencing enforcement
proceedings, as petitioner sought to do here.”).
296 Id. at 217.
297 Id. at 217–18.
298 Id. at 218 (citing Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 148 (1908)).
299 See also Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Acct. Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477, 490–91
(2010) (“We normally do not require plaintiffs to ‘bet the farm . . . by taking the violative
action’ before ‘testing the validity of the law,’ . . . and we do not consider this a ‘meaningful’
avenue of relief.” (first ellipses in original) (first quoting MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech,
Inc., 549 U.S. 118, 129 (2007); then citing Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908); and then
quoting Thunder Basin, 510 U.S., at 212)).
300 A few federal and state courts have somewhat dated cases alluding to the doctrine.
See, e.g., Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. Engman, 527 F.2d 1115, 1119 (2d Cir. 1975)
(“[O]ne has a due process right to contest the validity of a legislative or administrative order
affecting his affairs without necessarily having to face ruinous penalties if the suit is lost.”);
United States v. Rsrv. Mining Co., 412 F. Supp. 705, 708 (D. Minn. 1976) (“Because [the
defendant] mounted substantial, continuous legal challenges to [the legal provision it
violated], the law does not authorize imposition of penalties . . . .”); see also Union Elec. Co.
v. EPA, 593 F.2d 299, 306 (8th Cir. 1979) (rejecting constitutional tolling argument because
the power company “ha[d] an opportunity to test the validity of the Missouri
Implementation Plan” under the Clean Air Act “without necessarily incurring confiscatory
fines and penalties”); VECO Int’l, Inc. v. Alaska Pub. Offs. Comm’n, 753 P.2d 703, 718
(Alaska 1988) (declining to consider the constitutional tolling issue because administrative
regulations precluded the accumulation of penalties while a challenge was pending);
Danish Health Club, Inc. v. Kittery, 562 A.2d 663, 666–67 (Me. 1989) (holding that the
constitutional tolling doctrine was inapplicable where an ordinance had a 90-day grace
period before taking effect and regulated entities could have sought a preliminary

1876

NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 97:5

European Conference, the Federal Maritime Commission implemented
amendments to the Shipping Act by changing the form contract that
shipping conferences were required to use when transporting goods
internationally by steamship.301 Three conferences challenged the
commission’s order mandating the new form contract in federal court
and continued using their existing contract templates rather than
adopting the new form.302 The court ultimately rejected both the
conferences’ constitutional challenge to the Shipping Act
amendments as well as their objections to the form contract the
commission mandated.303
When these judicial challenges were over, the government sought
to recover fines from each conference for its failure to use the
Commission’s form contract while their judicial challenges had been
pending.304 Citing Wadley, the Ninth Circuit held that the constitutional tolling doctrine precluded the government from enforcing the
fines against the conferences.305 It explained, “Defendants ought not
to have to pay a statutory penalty for non-compliance with the 1961 Act
during the time they were judicially testing the validity of that Act, and
enjoying the benefits of any additional agency procedures secured to

injunction against its enforcement); cf. United States v. Charles George Trucking Co., 823
F.2d 685, 691 (1st Cir. 1987) (noting in a CERCLA case, without ruling on the issue, that
“[s]ome cases intimate that a good faith defense, timely asserted and earnestly pursued,
may be enough to stay the accumulation of punitive sanctions even if the defense ultimately
proves inadequate to pass an objective test of reasonableness”); United States v. W. Penn
Power Co., 460 F. Supp. 1305, 1320 (W.D. Pa. 1978) (declining to consider constitutional
tolling argument until the court reached a final decision establishing the amount of
penalties owed); United States v. Gulf Oil Corp., 408 F. Supp. 450, 461–62 (W.D. Pa. 1975)
(holding, in the context of a criminal prosecution, that the constitutional tolling doctrine
had to be raised as a defense at trial and could not be invoked to dismiss an indictment);
Commonwealth Edison Co. v. U.S. Nuclear Regul. Comm’n, 830 F.2d 610, 621 n.7 (7th Cir.
1987) (declining to consider the issue due to waiver).
Some courts have considered the doctrine in the course of statutory interpretation
as a basis for concluding that potentially substantial fines or penalties could not accumulate
under a legal provision while a litigant was bringing a good-faith challenge to it. See, e.g.,
Aminoil, Inc. v. United States, 646 F. Supp. 294, 299 (C.D. Cal. 1986); Ford Motor Co. v.
Coleman, 402 F. Supp. 475, 485–86 (D.D.C. 1975); In re Kimber Petroleum Corp., 539 A.2d
1181, 1186–88 (N.J. 1988). They have refused to apply the doctrine in the context of alleged
violations of consent decrees, however, on the grounds that the regulated entity voluntarily
entered into the decree in the first place. See, e.g., United States v. La.-Pac. Corp., 967 F.2d
1372, 1378 (9th Cir. 1992); Engman, 527 F.2d at 1119.
301 United States v. Pac. Coast Eur. Conf., 451 F.2d 712, 714–15 (9th Cir. 1971).
302 Id. at 714.
303 Id. at 715.
304 Id.
305 Id. at 717–18 (citing Wadley S. Ry. Co. v. Georgia, 235 U.S. 651, 662–63 (1915)).
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them in that litigation.”306 The court also noted that, under the
statutory scheme at issue, there was no way for the plaintiffs to
otherwise ask either the agency or the court to stay or enjoin the
accumulation of penalties.307 It rejected the government’s argument
that the defendants should have simply discontinued the use of their
preferred contracts while challenging the validity of the commission’s
new form contract.308
The court added that the defendants were entitled to
constitutional tolling even though their attack on the validity of the
form contract failed. A party’s right to raise constitutional and legal
challenges “free from the risk of statutory penalties must be judged,
not by this court’s after-the-fact determination, but by whether [it]
mounted a substantial attack upon the validity of the [challenged
provisions].”309 In late 2021, an Alaska district court applied this
precedent to find that a defendant shipping company was entitled to
constitutional tolling while challenging penalties in an enforcement
proceeding.310
The Supreme Court could facilitate constitutional review of
statutes creating private rights of action such as S.B. 8 by expressly
readopting, clarifying, and enforcing the constitutional tolling
doctrine. The doctrine most clearly applies to statutory private rights
of action that are enforceable through substantial fines, statutory
damages, or other forms of presumed damages; penalties that can
accumulate based on the party’s course of action over time; punitive
damages; or attorneys’ fees. When a statute creates a private right of
action, there is no governmental defendant against whom a regulated
entity can seek relief through a suit for preliminary relief under Ex
parte Young.311 Nor is there generally an agency that can stay or agree
to waive enforcement of the legal provisions at issue pending

306 Id. at 717; see also id. at 718 (“[T]he defendants promptly and vigorously challenged
the validity of the Commission order of March 27, 1964, and the 1961 statute on which it
was based. . . . [T]his is the precise sort of case of which the Supreme Court spoke in
Wadley.”).
307 Id. at 719 (“[T]he Government explains to us that a stay of, or injunction against,
the Commission order would have been totally ineffective to stop the statutory penalties
from accruing.”).
308 Id. at 718–19.
309 Id. at 719.
310 Kloosterboer Int’l Forwarding LLC v. United States, No. 21-cv-198, 2021 WL
4729303, at *6 (D. Alaska Oct. 10, 2021) (“[T]he Court finds that constitutional tolling
applies to preclude the imposition of additional penalties . . . until entry of final judgment
by this Court.”).
311 Cf. supra notes 46–48 and accompanying text.
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adjudication of a constitutional challenge.312 The constitutional
tolling doctrine would allow rightholders to raise nonfrivolous
challenges to statutory private rights of action without risking
substantial penalties.
One of the main drawbacks of this approach is that it effectively
treats every case as if the party raising the constitutional issue has
obtained a preliminary injunction barring enforcement of the
challenged legal provision. A court typically must weigh practical
factors, including the balance of hardships and public interest, before
granting such extraordinary relief.313 Any person regulated by a legal
provision would effectively have a free pass for violations until the
provision’s validity were upheld, and potentially until the end of any
appellate proceedings. Categorically (or even presumptively) allowing
for such broad exceptions to statutes without either an assessment of
the rightholder’s likelihood of success or consideration of the practical
consequences could seriously undermine the public interest and
interfere with the goals of the underlying regulatory scheme.
The Court might consider reshaping the doctrine into a more
discretionary principle. That is, it could require trial courts to take
into account the balance of hardships and public interest in deciding
whether to exempt a person who unsuccessfully asserts constitutional
defenses in an enforcement action from penalties. If courts made such
case-by-case determinations of whether constitutional tolling is
available for particular statutes, however, rightholders would have to
predict whether the court would apply the doctrine in their case. Yet
the whole point of the doctrine is to protect rightholders from having
to gamble and predict how a court will rule. Incorporating such
equitable considerations may strike the right balance between
broadening opportunities for judicial review and protecting important
public interests, but it is a difficult question.
Alternatively, the constitutional tolling doctrine might perhaps be
justified instead as a form of penalty default. Its existence and
application may induce legislators to establish a route for bringing
preenforcement challenges to legal provisions establishing private
rights of action. Alternatively, as a matter of statutory interpretation,
constitutional tolling could be adopted as a default rule that applies
unless Congress or a legislature expressly disclaims it. For measures
such as S.B. 8 that are drafted specifically to impede preenforcement

312
313

Cf. supra notes 283–84 and accompanying text.
See Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, 555 U.S. 7, 32 (2008).
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review,314 however, legislators would likely suspend constitutional
tolling, thereby defeating the goal of the doctrine.
Thus, constitutional tolling is one way that modern courts can,
and occasionally do, allow rightholders to seek judicial guidance
concerning a legal provision’s validity without exposing themselves to
substantial liability. It is a potentially effective response to the rise of
laws burdening constitutional rights that are enforceable only through
private rights of action. Though the doctrine has potential drawbacks,
there are different variations the Court could consider to help mitigate
them.
B. Abrogating Sovereign Immunity
Another alternative would be for Congress to exercise its authority
under Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment to abrogate state
sovereign immunity against private suits challenging private rights of
action under the U.S. Constitution (at least in circumstances where the
challenged restrictions are not also enforceable by governmental
officials). Congress has authority to abrogate state sovereign immunity
under Section Five,315 which empowers it to “enforce, by appropriate
legislation,” the rights created by that Amendment.316 The Fourteenth
Amendment not only protects critical due process and equal
protection rights but, through the incorporation doctrine, prohibits
states and their political subdivisions from violating most provisions in
the Bill of Rights, as well.317 Allowing preenforcement suits in federal
or state court to challenge the constitutionality of statutes that appear
to violate the Fourteenth Amendment appears to be an appropriate
way of enforcing those rights.
If Congress were to abrogate state sovereign immunity against
such claims, a rightholder could sue the State as an entity, as the
government did in United States v. Texas,318 thereby alleviating the
problem of being unable to sue a proper defendant under Young.
Such a plaintiff could seek an injunction barring the state, as well as
any state officials, state employees, and anyone else acting in concert
with the state,319 from taking any steps to enforce S.B. 8 against it. The
plaintiff could also seek a declaratory judgment that the challenged

314 See supra notes 13–27 and accompanying text.
315 Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 756 (1999).
316 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5.
317 McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 764 & n.12 (2010); see also Timbs v.
Indiana, 139 S. Ct. 682, 687 (2019).
318 See supra notes 83–100 and accompanying text.
319 FED. R. CIV. P. 65(d)(2).
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legal provision is unconstitutional and use that judgment to bar any
future litigation against it.320 The lynchpin of these arguments is that
state action plays an unavoidable role in the enforcement of an
unconstitutional statute—particularly in state court—even if private
plaintiffs are the only ones authorized to invoke it.321
Apart from the direct effects of an injunction or declaratory
judgment, if a case against the state as an entity were appealed, the
appellate court’s opinion would likely have vertical stare decisis effect.
Its ruling could protect both the plaintiff in that case, as well as other
rightholders, from suit in any trial court bound by the appellate court’s
precedents. In this respect, a lawsuit in state court might have greater
effect than a federal lawsuit (insofar as most claims under a state law
are likely to be brought in state court).
This approach faces several obstacles, however. First, it is
questionable whether Congress, as a political matter, would be willing
to enact such legislation. A bipartisan consensus might emerge if
various states enacted laws creating private rights of action targeting a
range of constitutional rights favored by each of the major political
parties. At present, however, the prospect of such a federal statute
seems remote. Second, the Supreme Court’s grant of certiorari before
judgment in United States v. Texas—a case which, to be sure, involved
additional complications—suggests that the Court may disagree with
at least some of the reasoning underlying this strategy.322
Finally, there may be some question as to such a law’s
constitutionality under City of Boerne v. Flores.323 Boerne held that, for
legislation to fall within the scope of Congress’s Section Five authority,
“[t]here must be a congruence and proportionality between the injury
to be prevented or remedied and the means adopted to that end.”324
The “appropriateness of remedial measures” under Section Five “must
be considered in light of the evil presented.”325 Broadly speaking, to
320 But see Women’s Health Clinic v. State, 825 So. 2d 1208, 1210, 1213 (La. Ct. App.
2002) (holding that the plaintiff lacked standing to sue the state to challenge the
constitutionality of a law establishing a private right of action).
321 See Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 20 (1948) (holding that state court enforcement
of a racially restrictive covenant in a civil suit between private parties is state action that
violates the Fourteenth Amendment); see also Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249, 254 (1953)
(applying Shelley to damages claims).
322 United States v. Texas, 142 S. Ct. 14, 14 (2021) (mem.) (granting certiorari on the
question of whether the United States may “bring suit in federal court and obtain injunctive
or declaratory relief against the State, state court judges, state court clerks, other state
officials, or all private parties to prohibit S.B. 8 from being enforced”).
323 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
324 Id. at 520.
325 Id. at 530 (citing South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 308 (1966)).
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fall within Section Five, a statute must be reasonably tailored326 to
preventing actual (not merely hypothetical) violations of constitutional rights as those rights have been defined by the Supreme
Court,327 as demonstrated by evidence in the legislative record.328
Applying this demanding standard, the Court has invalidated several
federal laws as exceeding Congress’s authority under Section Five of
the Fourteenth Amendment due to the lack of sufficient evidence that
a substantial threat to constitutional rights existed.329
Objections under Section Five are unlikely to prevail, however. A
federal statute allowing rightholders to sue a state on the grounds that
a private right of action established by state law violates their rights
under the U.S. Constitution appears to fit comfortably within the
Court’s ruling in United States v. Georgia.330 In that case, the Court
unanimously held that Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act
validly abrogated state sovereign immunity insofar as a plaintiff wished
to sue for an actual constitutional violation.331 The Court declared,
“[N]o one doubts that § 5 grants Congress the power to ‘enforce . . .
326 Id. at 532 (“Preventive measures prohibiting certain types of laws may be
appropriate when there is reason to believe that many of the laws affected by the
congressional enactment have a significant likelihood of being unconstitutional.” (citing
City of Rome v. United States, 446 U.S. 156, 177 (1980))).
327 Id. at 527–28 (rejecting the notion that Congress may “enact legislation that
expands the rights contained in § 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment”).
328 Id. at 530 (invalidating the Religious Freedom Restoration Act as it applied to state
and local legal provisions, in part because its “legislative record lacks examples of modern
instances of generally applicable laws passed because of religious bigotry”).
329 See, e.g., Coleman v. Ct. of Appeals of Md., 566 U.S. 30, 37–38 (2012) (plurality
opinion) (invalidating provision of the Family Medical Leave Act because the Court
concluded there was no “evidence of a pattern of state constitutional violations,” such as
“sex discrimination or sex stereotyping in the administration of sick leave”); Bd. of Trs. of
the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 368, 374 (2001) (“The legislative record of the
ADA, however, simply fails to show that Congress did in fact identify a pattern of irrational
state discrimination in employment against the disabled.”); Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents,
528 U.S. 62, 89 (2000) (“Congress never identified any pattern of age discrimination by the
States, much less any discrimination whatsoever that rose to the level of constitutional
violation.”); United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 625–27 (2000) (invalidating provision
of the Violence Against Woman Act because “Congress’ findings indicate that the problem
of discrimination against the victims of gender-motivated crimes does not exist in all States,
or even most States”); Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. College Sav. Bank,
527 U.S. 627, 640, 645–47 (1999) (“[T]he record at best offers scant support for Congress’
conclusion that States were depriving patent owners of property without due process of law
by pleading sovereign immunity in federal-court patent actions.”).
330 546 U.S. 151 (2006). I am grateful to Professor William Baude for making this
point.
331 Id. at 159 (“[I]nsofar as Title II creates a private cause of action for damages against
the States for conduct that actually violates the Fourteenth Amendment, Title II validly
abrogates state sovereign immunity.”).
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the provisions’ of the [Fourteenth] Amendment by creating private
remedies against the States for actual violations of those provisions.”332
Thus, if Congress wished to enact such a law, the measure would likely
be within its Section Five enforcement power.
CONCLUSION
A line of Supreme Court authority tracing back to Ex parte Young
recognizes that litigants have a due process right to obtain a judicial
ruling on the constitutionality of a legal provision without running the
risk of incurring potentially substantial liability by violating it. Litigants
can typically exercise this right by invoking Ex parte Young’s exception
to sovereign immunity to bring a preenforcement lawsuit to enjoin the
government officials responsible for enforcing the allegedly
unconstitutional legal provision.
Justiciability restrictions, sovereign immunity, and related
procedural constraints have long posed substantial barriers, however,
to bringing such preenforcement constitutional challenges to legal
provisions creating private rights of action. S.B. 8 attempts to exploit
those difficulties to chill the exercise of constitutional rights as
recognized by the U.S. Supreme Court. When government officials
lack enforcement authority over a statute, a traditional Young suit is
unavailable.
The Whole Woman’s Health Court considered the possibility of
allowing a Young-type cause of action against state court clerks, but
concluded that their ministerial functions in impartially accepting
court filings and docketing cases did not make them proper
defendants.333 An even more direct way to enforce the right to
preenforcement judicial guidance in the context of private rights of
action would be to expand Ex parte Young’s exception to sovereign
immunity. The Court could allow rightholders to challenge allegedly
unconstitutional state laws that are only enforceable through private
litigation by suing the state governor or attorney general. This
approach would raise serious justiciability and res judicata problems,
however, and directly conflict with the Court’s ruling in Fitts v. McGhee
that sovereign immunity bars such suits because they directly target the
state as an entity.334
A less effective, though more readily available alternative would
be for the Court to expressly reaffirm and apply the doctrine of

332
333
334

Id. at 158 (quoting U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5).
See supra notes 101–05 and accompanying text.
Fitts v. McGhee, 172 U.S. 516, 530 (1899).
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constitutional tolling.335 This doctrine applies when a person has no
preenforcement means of obtaining a judicial ruling concerning the
constitutionality of a legal provision that regulates their conduct. If
that person is sued for violating the provision, they may raise their
constitutional defense in the ensuing proceedings. The doctrine
provides that, even if the court ultimately upholds the challenged
measure as valid, that person is not liable for statutory damages, fines,
or other penalties that would otherwise apply (so long as their
constitutional challenge was substantial). The doctrine arises from the
due process principle that a state may not force a person to choose
between foregoing the exercise of their constitutional rights in order
to avoid the risk of substantial penalties, and engaging in conduct that
would trigger substantial liability if the court winds up rejecting their
constitutional claim.336 The Court applied the doctrine in several
Young-era cases where regulated entities faced either substantial
penalties or small penalties that threatened to accumulate, and some
modern courts continue to recognize it.
A main drawback to this approach is that it essentially treats the
underlying legal provision as if a court has granted a preliminary
injunction against it, without expressly taking into account traditional
equitable considerations such as the balance of hardships and public
interest. Moreover, some people may attempt to exploit the doctrine
through insubstantial constitutional claims. To the extent a court
determines the doctrine’s applicability on a case-by-case basis,
however, even an entity attempting to invoke it in good faith could find
itself unexpectedly subject to substantial liability. Nevertheless, by
adopting a modified version of the doctrine which expressly takes into
account practical considerations such as the balance of hardships and
public interest, a modern court can limit adverse consequences while
protecting rightholders from unconstitutional laws that are
enforceable only by private plaintiffs.

335
336

See supra Section IV.A.
See supra notes 149, 241, and accompanying text.
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